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PREFACE 
I~hile often overshadowed by faculty research, the efforts of students 
should not be overlooked, and this journal hopefully will encourage scholarly 
research by students and provide a means by which their efforts will be recog-
nized. Phi Alpha Theta is grea tly indebted to the History Department of 
I~estern Kentucky University head d by Dr. Ri chard Tr outman . I<e are grateful 
to our Consul t ing Editors, Dr . Charles Bussey , Dr . Ca r ol Crowe Carraco, and 
Dr . David Lee, for their assistance in this projec t. For their tireless and 
exacting effor t Phi Alpha Theta thanks our typists, Lecia Mayhugh and Ruth 
Cornelius . Our most profound deb t of gratitude goes to the contributing 
writers--those who were published and those who were not-- that constitute a 
group which forms the heart of any publication . 
The logo of Phi Alpha Theta appears on the cover of the journal. The 
six-pointed s tar, which is composed of two triangles, is worked in black 
enamel and laid on a circular frame, the whole encircled by a Serpent. Three 
forces may be thought of as controlling man and the universe: the Fa ther, 
the I<ord, and the Spirit - a trinity which is symbolized by one of the 
triangles. Ancient philosophers believed that man and the world were made 
of thre elements - Spirit , Blood , and I<ater. These are represented by 
the second triangle of the St ar . The triangle with apex below the base 
symbolizes the spiritual and divine . The Greek letter Pi signifies Pater 
(Father), and letter Psi signifies Psyche (Spirit), and the letter Lambda 
signifies Logos (I'ord). The triangle with apex above the base symbolizes 
the earthly and human . The letter Alpha signifies Ha ima (Blood), the 
letter Upsilon signifies Hydor (I~ater), and the let t er Psi signifies Psyche 
(Spi rit) . 
The union of these two triangles forming the six-pointed s t ar (the 
Ancient Assyrian sign of divinity) symbolizes the intima t e relation be-
tween the divine and the human . By some ancient peoples the Serpent was 
regarded as a symbol of eternity, good fortune , and plenty . In our symbolism , 
it signifies happiness , fruitfulness and eternity . IHthin the two triangles 
are the three letters Phi, Alpha , Theta - Phil i a , Anthropos , Theos - signifying 
Love , Nan, God . 
Et a Pi Chap t er 
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JAMES ED"rARD OGLETHORPE: CmIl1ANDER- I '- CHIEF FOR THE 
FORCES OF SOUTH CAROL! A AND GEORGIA , 1738-43 
James Edward Oglethorpe, most often remembered as the humanitarian fo unde r 
o[ the colony of Georgia, played an equally important role as defender of the 
British claim on t he southern f r ontier of America . More t han anyo ne else, it 
was Oglethorpe who obtained men and money for the es t ablishment of t he Brit ish 
lin of defense against the Spanish in Florida. Yet his mili t a r y exploits are 
overshadowed by the settlement and reform efforts that took place within the 
colony. The fac t remains, however, it was James Oglethorpe whom Ki ng Geor ge 
II entrusted with the militarv responsibilitv for South Car olina and Geor gia 
during the \,ar of Jenkins ' Ear . 
He was born on December 22 , 1696 , the ninth child of Theophilus and Eleanor 
Oglethorpe . His fa t her was a member of the English gentry who , i n 1709 , pur-
chased a commission for James as Ensign in Her ~bjesty ' s Footgua rds , an elite 
regiment assigned t o the palace . l Four years later young Ogle thorpe was ap-
pointed Captain of the Footguards with the r ank of Lieutenant , but the acqui-
sition of officer ' s rank marked the end of his early milita r y career fo r his 
parents insisted upon the completion of his educa tion . I n 1713 Ogl e t horpe 
enter d Eton Co llege a nd la t e r wen t to Oxfo r d t o complete hi s s t udies a t Co r pus 
Christi College, but after only t wO years he lef t s chool t o be with hi s family 
in France . Although e nroll d in an Academy , Og l ethorpe ' s des ire fo r the mi li-
tary returned a nd in 1717 he joined the army of Pr i nce Eugene of Savoy , t hrough 
purchase of another commission . 2 Op,lethorpe never distinguished hi msel f in 
battle and soon realized that his capabilities and enthusiasm for a mil i t a r y 
life were both less than anticipated . Instead , upon returning to his homeland , 
h secured a seat in Parliament and entered English politics . 
In 1729, as Chairman of a House of Commons committee, Oglethorpe exposed 
the deplorable condi t ions of gaols in which debtor s were placed . His i nves ti-
ga tive actions revealed the corrupt prison system in England , an issue which 
Ogl e thorpe exploi t ed for personal gain in Parliament, a nd one which in t urn , 
preceded his most notable achievement . 3 In 1732 he devised a pl a n by wh i ch 
England might alleviate its overcrowded gaols and reduce unemployment by pro-
viding a new area of settlement on the southern fron t ier o[ America . 4 Such a 
colony would be impor t ant in several respects : i t would relocate the les s fo r-
tunat e , aid the mercantile policy of trade wi t h Ame r ica, and expand Br i ti s h 
in f lue nce in the south . The p,reatest contribu t ion , however, would be t he 
establishment of a buffer zone between the English settlemen t s i n Sou t h Ca r olina 
and the Spanish in Florida . With these benefits i n mind , Geo r ge 11 char t er ed 
the co lony of Georgia on April 23 . 1732 . 
In November of the same year . Oglethorpe and t he fi r st group of se tt ler s 
crossed the Atlantic and landed at Charlestown in Janua r y, 1733. Wit hin weeks, 
the co lonists selected a high bluff on the Savannah River on which t o es t ablish 
the f irst settlements in Georgia. However, the area was already inhabi t ed by 
the Yamacraw Indians who, although peaceful, were nevertheless cautious of t he 
\4hi t intruders. Oglethorpe nego tia ted immedia tely a trea t y wi t h Tomochichi , 
chieftain of t he Yamacraws, which was beneficial t o bo th part ies . Ogle t ho r pe 
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promised fair trading practices from English merchants and a fair price for land 
in return for an alliance with the Indians. 5 
During the years 1734-35, as new settlers began to arrive with some degree 
of regularity, Oglethorpe directed the building of a series of fortifications 
along the Georgia coastline to extend and strengthen the British claim. The 
construction of these forts intensified uneasy feelings between the two nations, 
and Oglethorpe received an additional 700 men from the English standing army as 
well as being commissioned Brigadier-General and Commander-in-Chief of all forces 
in the southernmost colonies. 6 
In an attempt to pacify relations in America, Oglethorpe and the Spanish 
Governor of Florida, Moral Sanchez, reached a tentative agreement called the 
Treaty of Frederica. The terms of the document stated that each nation would 
refrain from harassing tactics, control their respective Indian allies, and 
allow the mother countries to decide any territorial disputes. Oglethorpe also 
agreed t o abandon some of his southernmost forts, but these terms enraged the 
Spanish King, Philip V, who recalled Sanchez and repudiated the treaty.7 
Oglethorpe sensed that fighting would occur eventually between the two 
colonial powers and that Georg ia, a buffer zone, would become a major theater 
of operations in the south. He was attending a tribal council of Indian allies 
when news of war reached him in 1740. The Indians demonstrated their allegiance 
to Oglethorpe, as it was they who supplied the first information of Spanish 
troop movements in Florida. A small party of Creeks, while on a hunting expe-
dition into northern Florida, discovered a Spanish plan to sail against Ogle-
thorpe's forts. Furthermore, Oglethorpe learned that the Spanish had killed 
two unarmed Scottish Highlanders during a raid on Amelia Island . 8 War and 
bloodshed was now a reality in America, and Oglethorpe determined to lead his 
British forces to victory. 
Early in 1740 Oglethorpe mobilized his men for an offensive into Florida. 
His objective was St. Augustine, the key port for commerce that passed between 
Spain and her rich Caribbean colonies. This trade route was of utmost impor-
tance because if it were severed, the Spanish "ar effort would be affected in 
Georgia as well as in Europe.9 In late February a British fleet, under the 
command of Commodore Vincent Pearse, started patrolling the Florida coast to 
prevent supplies from reaching St. Augustine. Parliament, meanwhile, appro-
priated the money Oglethorpe requested for the campa ign, and South Carolina 
voted to send 400 men to Georgia for the offensive. 
Oglethorpe commanded a military force consisting of his Indian allies, 
South Carolina militia, troops from England, and local Georgians. Also at his 
disposal was the fleet under Pearse . Oglethorpe planned to assemble his forces 
at the St. Johns River in northern Florida as soon as possible, then take St . 
Augustine before the advent of summer. But the South Carolina troops, under 
the command of Alexander Vanderdrussen, were deliberate in their movements 
which disrupted the original plan of a pre-summer campaign . Oglethorpe grew 
impatient and declared, "the longer we delay attacking them, the stronger they 
will be. "10 Vanderdrussen made contact finally with the expedition in early 
Hay, and Oglethorpe set out for St. Augustine with more than 1500 men under his 
command . 
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On May 12, 1740, the combatants approached a small camp, Fort Diego . Ogle-
thorpe demanded and received its immediate surrender . 11 Although no one knew 
it a t the time, this encounter was the on ly real vic t o r y of the expedition for 
the British force. 12 A week later Ogletho r pe and Pea rs e decided , based upon 
their limited information of the defenses at St . Augustine, that a two-front 
a tcack was the best course o[ action, with Ogle thorpe driving the civilians out 
of the town and into the fort, which Pea rse a nd his fleet would then bomba rd 
into submission . 
In late May the invading force moved further south to For t Hosa, an abandoned 
settlement only two miles north of St . Augustine. l-lhen Ogl ethorpe reconnoitered 
the area , however, he r ealized that the impregnable walls of St . Augustine made 
a frontal attack impossible . Horeover, the Spanish had placed six half - ga lleys 
in the shal low wa t ers surrounding the for t, a nd these small vessels , armed with 
nine pound cannon, wo uld prevent Pearse from moving int o position for his bom-
oardment of the fort. In order for the British flee t ca nnon to be effec t ive, 
Pearse would have to en t er the harbor and subject his ships t o a crossfire from 
the fort and the half- galleys, something ,~hich he was not willing to do . There-
fo re , without cannon support f r om the fleet, the original plan of Oglethorpe 
was discarded and a new scheme devised. Pearse recommended that a siege be 
implemented with his ships producing the necessary blockade, but he stipulated 
that if the Spanish did not submit by July 5 , he would disemba rk and return to 
England . His cour of naval duty would have then expired, and the hurricane 
season would be app r oaching . 13 With no other immediace al ternatives, Ogle thorpe 
consented reluctantly. 
As days turned into weeks, the Spanish showed no signs of surrendering . 
Obviously, the food supply within the fort was greater than ancicipated and 
Oglethorpe , impatient for action , decided to elimina te the half - gal ley s in the 
harbor . A new plan developed as Pearse secured Anastasia Island, east of the 
[art, where cannon were placed to fire upon the small vessels. Another battery 
was located on Point Quartell, nort heast of St . Augustine, under the direction 
of Vanderdrussen, to f ire upon the fort. During the afternoon of June 14, 
Oglethorpe received word that all troops were in position for the assaul t upon 
the half-galleys a nd fort, but he decided to wait a nd a ttack at dawn . This 
decision was the turning point of the St. Augustine campaign . 
Upon his arrival at Fort Mosa several we eks earlier, Oglethorpe dispatched 
a small number of men t o pa trol the area daily and to be cons tantly on the move. 
If the Spanish were a'~are of the pa trol 's loca tion, they would be f r ee to roam 
elsewhere and resupply their stock of food. BlIt as the days of marching became 
monoto nous and the scorching heat bore down upon them, the disillusioned soldiers 
camped outside Fort Mosa.14 The food supply within St. Augustine was nearing 
exhaustinn when the Spanish Governor of Florida, Manuel de Montiano , conceived 
a pre-dawn attack upon t he British. He assembled 300 men and while the invaders 
slept , the Spaniards attacked . Earlier that morning, the 15th, Oglethorpe 's 
Rangers reported that they had heard Spanish Indians doing a wa r dance, but the 
informa tion was discarded a nd no alarm raised by the English. 15 Oglethorpe's 
men were caught asleep, unarmed, a nd unprepared fo r a fight . The a ttack became 
a r out with over 65 Englishmen killed and 34 imprisoned out of a total of 135 
men. Two days before t he a tta ck, the Spanish were almost ready t o acknowledge 
defeat; now they refused to yield t o Op.lethorpe's demands for surrender . 16 
This debacle demoralized the British troops , yet Oglethorpe was more determined 
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than ever to ca rry out his mission . On June 21 he commenced a four day bombard-
ment of the fort, which did not induce the Spanish to s ubmission nor silence their 
guns. 
Oglethorpe was understandably puzzled as to what his next move should be . 
He had tried several tactics but none had succeeded . Vanderdrussen opted for a 
night raid, but Pearse disapproved because he was wary of the shallow water around 
the fort. Next, Vanderdrussen proposed a battery be set up to control access to 
the mouth of the St. Sebastion River . If this could be accomplished, St. Augustine 
would be encompassed and all supplies would be halted. However, the new plan re-
quired at least seven more ships, and on June 26, Pearse stated bluntly that he 
would not assist in the new endeavor. No~' within a week of his departure, he 
would not risk any ships or men, leaving Oglethorpe t o combat the Spanish as best 
he could. 
As the hot, sultry days ushered in the month of July, a series of events 
guaranteed Oglethorpe ' s fail ure in Florida. On July 3, some small vessels were 
able to slip past the English fleet and resupply St. Augustine with food. With 
the fort partially restocked , all prospect of starving the enemy in the near 
future was lost . The fleet was leaving in only two days, Oglethorpe ' s own men 
were disgruntled, and most of the Carolina troops were sick or fatigued as a 
result of the humid summer days. Finally, Oglethorpe himself fell ill with fever, 
and on July 4, 1740, he o rdered a retreat to Georgia. 
The expedition was a failure, but "ho was to blame? Obviously, Oglethorpe's 
original plan of a combined land and sea attack required almost perfect coordina-
tion, sometimes difficult under the best of circumstances and not feasible under 
the exis ting condi tions. }Ioreover. Op.lethorpe planned originally for an early 
spring assault on the fortress , but had to wait until Hay, when additional help 
arrived in the person of Vanderdrussen and his men. Furthermore, some of Ogle-
thorpe's own men diSObeyed his orders at Fort Hosa and paid the price with their 
lives . If they had been on patrol as instructed, a successful Spanish attack 
was improbable and supplies as well as morale withjn the fort would have continued 
In decline. 
The fleet, under Pearse, was another factor in the failure of the campaign. 
Pearse a nd his ships proved to be no more than spectators throughout the offensive. 
By allowing the half-galleys to control the harbor, without at tempting to elimi-
nate them, Pearse crippled Oglethorpe's principle plan of attack . The fleet cannon 
did fire upon the fort, but inflicted no serious damage, and when several ships 
pulled back from their original positions, the siege collapsed . Pearse seemed 
not to care ; his main concern was the security of his ships, not the capture of 
St. Augustine. His lack of initiative was an open invitation to the Spanish, 
who responded by slipping a number of small vessels through the loosely construc-
ted blockade. 
Oglethorpe also must bear partial r esponsibility for the defeat . He comman-
ded a formidable army, yet never utilized the full potential of the force. After 
his first abortive attempt, Oglethorpe was seemingly mystified and relied on sub-
ordinates, whose plans likewise met with failure. He must also accept blame for 
the fiasco outside Fort Hosa . Although not present at the attack, the men were 
under his command and, therefore, they were his responsibility. Lastly, Oglethorpe 
was ill with fever, another el .. ment which must be considered when recounting his 
inability to capture St. Augustine. 
5 
But possibly the ~rea test reason for the fa ilure o f the expedition was the 
determined Spanish resistance . \~hile Oglethorpe led his troops through northe r n 
Florida, Montiano withdr w his men to their best equipped location, St. Augus tine . 
By placing the half-galleys in the harbor , the Spani.sh dealt a mortal blow to t he 
original plan o[ Oglethorpe , as the fleet was forced to anchor offshor e . When 
Hon tiano devised a pre- dawn :1 t tack upon .on "reo} whi ch OPo ] etho rpe occupi.ed , it 
was s uccessful no t only in defeating the English and acquiring badly needed food , 
but it also provided the extra incentive necessary to hold out during the siege . 
It was a tired , disappointed man, sick with fever who drew his army back 
before the walls of St . Augustine , but if Oglethorpe had failed in his prima r y 
objective , he had at least succeeded in delaying a Spanish attack on Georgia .1 7 
During t he spring of 1741 Oglethorpe strengthened his fo rtifications , repaired 
old batter ies , and made several appeals for additional men , but England coul d 
not spare any t roops because of t he continental war I.lith Spain . In a let t er 
wr it ten t o Sir Robert Walpole, England ' s leading minister, Oglethorpe reported 
that he had fortified as well as he could all t he outposts . all t hat r emained 
was to wait . 18 Bu t the Spanish did not appear that year and 1741 passed with-
oue any serious encounter~ . 
Oglethorpe . by his failure in Florida and th absence of an expec t ed Spanish 
counterattack , dre,,, into ques t ion his competence as th e mili tary leader of Georgia , 
but at a time when he well could have been discouraged . the summer of 1742 produced 
the most glo rious incident in Oglethorpe's ca reer as a soldier . 19 During May , 
he received reports of gr eat ly increased travel b tween Cuba and St. Augus t i ne; 
Montiano IoTas being res upplied and an attack on Georgia appeared forthcomi ng. The 
Creeks confirmed this news as they skirmished with a Spa nish scouting party wi th i n 
Georgia ' s boundaries . Although the tension eased for a time as excess i ve rains 
fel l for a two week period, when they subsided on J une 21 . 1742 , the Spanish ex-
changed cannon fire with Fort Prince William on the souther n tip of Geor gia . The 
long dreaded invasion had begun . 20 
Montiano, again the leader of the Spanish , commanded a f l ee t of 51 ships 
and almost 2 , 000 soldiers . 21 He planned to invade St . Simons Island , work hi s 
way up the coastline to Fort Frederica , and eventually into South Ca r o lina . He 
was instructed by Philip V to conduct his campaigns wi t h a mi nimum l oss of Spa ni s h 
lives . On June 27, Oglethorpe arrived at Fort St . Simons . Even with additional 
troops from Fort Frederica, his total force in Georgia numbered no mor e tha n 
1,000 men. Oglethorpe had no nav y , except for a few small vessels, but he was 
de termin ed to inflic t as much damage an the enemy at St . Simons as possible . I f 
his defense" could "'ithstand the Spanish attack for an extended pe r iod of time , 
Oglethorpe hoped that additional men could be secured from South Carolina . 
As morning dawned, June 28. the main elements of t he Spa nish flee t appea r ed 
off St . Simons Island . But once again, the weather intervened as t he pr evai ling 
wind direction prevented the ships from entering t he channel. Ogl e thorpe used 
this delay to s t rengthen his defenses, and by the time the Spa nish wer e r eady 
to attack , he had more than one- ha l f of his total fo r ce on St . Si mons . 22 On 
July 5, the wind and tide were both righ t to enter the chan nel a nd t he Spanish 
exchanged fire with Oglethorpe ' s cannon, but the ships wer e able t o sli p pas t 
and outflank the garrison . As darkness fell , Ogle t ho r pe wi thdrew t o For t Frede r ica 
with all the artillery and supplies tha t could be t ranspo rt ed; t he r emai nde r was 
destroyed . 23 Two days later, the most important con t ac t be t ween t he oppos ing 
armies occur ed at tt Bloody Harsh . " ~1ontiano sent o u t a small de tachment t o s cout 
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the island, but as the Spanish advanced, they encountered Oglethorpe's Rangers 
on patrol . Each side fired several shots and the Rangers scurried back to Fort 
Frederica to report the clash . Oglethorpe assumed immediately this force to be 
Mon tiano ' s frontal a t tack and he ordered his Indian allies and Bri tish regulars 
forward to skirmish against the enemy. The Spanish advanced to within one mile 
of Fort Frederica before they were engaged by Oglethorpe and his men . In close 
fighting, the British proved to be most effective and overwhelmed the invaders . 
This small battle left 36 Spaniards killed, wounded or captured whereas Ogle-
thorpe lost only one man. 
When the remnants of the Spanish scouting party returned to camp and reported 
the clash, Montiano became enraged and ordered an additional 200 men to march back 
and clear the way for his invading force . Meanwhile. Oglethorpe placed his men 
at strategic positions throughout a tvooded, marshy area on the trail to Frederica , 
and as the Spanish troops approached, the hidden Englishmen fired a volley. Dense 
undergrowth limited visibility, yet each side fired at will. The English line 
broke, however, when they realized the Spanish were far superior in numbers. \~en 
Oglethorpe heard the sound of renewed fighting he hastened to the scene of battle, 
only to find his troops retreating in disarray. 24 Oglethorpe encouraged his men 
to hold their positions and the English counterattacked with Oglethorpe leading 
the charge. Although he had less than one- half the number of the Spanish army, 
Oglethorpe routed the advance force of Montiano and the English pursued until 
they were within a mile of the main body of the Spanish camp. But after viewing 
the Spanish entrenchments, Oglethorpe decided to march back to Frederica, rest 
his men and wait for a better opportunity to strike the Spanish . 25 
On July 9, a Spanish deserter informed Oglethorpe of the declining morale 
among the enemy, and three days later. Oglethorpe and his men advanced toward 
Montiano in a daring night raid. Their surprise attack was spoiled how'ever, when 
a soldier fired his musket and fled to the enemy's lines. It is not known whether 
the musket was fired on purpose or by accident, but Montiano was alerted to the 
presence of the English, and Oglethorpe returned to Frederica . 26 
During the next week Oglethorpe penned a letter to his musket-firing deserter, 
instructing him to understate the strength of the English army and add other details 
which would induce Montiano to attack. In actuality, the understatement of strength 
was very close to the truth, but ~Iontiano did not knm" this. Oglethorpe placed 
the letter within a Spanish prisoner's belongings and set him free , knowing he 
would return to his camp.27 Immediately upon arriving, the freed Spaniard under-
'vent questioning and a search revealed the letter which was given to Montiano, who 
became very suspicious of it . That same afternoon, five British commer cial vessels 
were spotted to the north of St . Simons. These ships posed no threat to the Spanish, 
but Montiano questioned whether or not they \.Jere a forerunner of the naval support 
which Oglethorpe lacked, and if so , the entire Spanish fleet could be trapped Vlithin 
the harbor . Faced with these circumstances, Montiano ordered an immediate retreat 
from St. Simons I sland and by July 15, the Spanish fleet was offshore at Fort 
Prince Hill i am , heading for St . Augus t i ne . This departure marked Spain ' s las t full 
scale a t tempt t o dislodge the British f r om the southern frontier of America . 28 
The expUlsion of the Spanish and the successful defense of Georgia by Ogle-
thorpe was the result of many diverse elements . Often overlooked by con temporaries, 
the weather pl ayed a role in determining the victory . Ifhen heavy ra i ns fell i n 
June, the Span i sh were prevented from mobilizing accord ing to schedule , and when 
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they ar rived a t St . Simons, the wind and tide combined to prohibit the ships from 
entering the harbor . This delay allowed Oglethor pe addi tional time to prepare 
his defenses . 
Furthermore , Hontiano ' s inability to conunand troops in offensive action has-
tened the English vic t ory . The Spanish commande r had twice as many men as Ogle-
thorpe and easily could have outnumbered his opponent , had he been willing to send 
out a s ufficient number of troops against Fort Frederica . Hontiano ' s conservative 
nature led to his own defeat . Horeover, Philip V' s order for a minimal loss of 
life preRerved the victory . Although Ho n tiano possessed incompl ete information 
concerni ng Oglethorpe ' s defenses, he was confident of victory . But when British 
vessels appeared off the coast , Hontiano withdrew his men fearing a naval conflict 
in which his f l ee t could be inferior, and at the very least , trapped within the 
harbor . 
Oglethorpe can accept all the honors bestowed for the s uccess f ul defense of 
Georgia . He was much better suit d for defensive manoeuvring of troops, and demon-
strated a courageous vigor in the fighting . rallying , and leading of his men to 
victory . Given the vast difference in size of fo rces, Oglethorpe displayed an 
unusual ability t o use effectively his limited resources , and even psychological 
warfare on his opponent. Only two yea r s after his rebuff in Florida , Oglethorpe 
had developed the qualities o[ a s uccessful defensive soldier . 
Sev ral weeks after the Spanish depa rture , a relief fleet from South Car olina 
anchored a t For t Frederica . 1.1 th six Bri tish Hen of I.ar, six smaller armed vessels 
and several scou ting boats, Oglethorpe ordered a naval counterat t ack upon St . 
Au~ustine . The small navy appeared off t he Spanish fortress in late August, 1742 . 
The half-galleys still blockaded the harbor , but since Oglethorpe possessed smaller 
ships, which could enter the shallow waters , he fel t confident of elimina ting the 
pesky vessels . But a high tide and strong surf prevented his s hips from ente ring 
the harbor for several days, and with hurricane season approaching rapidly, Ogle-
thorpe decided to return to t he safety of his colony . 29 
In the spring of 1743 he tried once more t o conquer St . Augustine . By dis-
patching his men in small groups, marching constantly and r avagi ng the area around 
the fo rt, Ogle thorpe hoped to lure the Spanish ou t to skirmish agains t his forces. 
But they were not duped by such tactics and refu sed to leave their garrison. Sev-
eral we ks later Oglethorpe ord red his fo r ces back t o Georgia, resigned to his 
failure to cap ture the elusive Spanish base . He would not try again t o take St . 
Augustine . 
Oglethorpe sailed for England in late 174 3 t o explore the current si tuation 
on the continent . He was never to return to Georg ia . In March , 1744, Oglethorpe 
received his own regiment of Britjsh troops and a commission as Ha jor-Genera l , but 
the rank was short-lived . The following yea r fo rmal court martial cha r ges were 
brought agains t him for neglect of duty, when he failed to guard effectively an 
escape route which Scottish r ebels used to elude cap ture . Oglethorpe resigned 
his commission , and although acquitted of the charge , his life as a soldier ended . 30 
James Oglethorpe exhibited personal courage , ene r gy, and determination du r ing 
his campaigns i n the south . He possessed an inner fe rvor as field commander, a nd 
despit his failures at St. Augustine, he s uccessfully defended his own territory, 
his own home, his own dream . Although Oglethorpe tried to cap ture St . Augus tine 
on sev ral occasions, it was his refusal t o yield t o the Spanish invasion of Georgia 
8 
which was of far greater militarv i~portancc. Oglethorpe's life as a soldier took 
him from standard European tactics in 1718 to guerilla tactics against the Spanish 
in 1742 . He experienced both success and failure on the battlefield, but it was 
his victorious defensive campai~n of Georgia which preserved his reputation as a 
soldier . During his lif time, James Edward Oglethorpe founded Georgia, adminis -
tered to its every need, and successfully defended the British claim on the south-
ern frontier of America . 
9 
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CHARLES DICKENS: 
SOCIAL CONSCIENCE OF VICTORIAN ENGLAND 
The richest and most complex portrait of Victorian England was not drawn 
with pastels and paints, but with pen and ink; its artist was not Hogarth or 
Hillais or Rosetti, but a novelist whose name has become synonymous with nine-
teenth cen tury England: Charles Dickens . Recognized by literary critics and 
historians alike for his panoramic view of English life, Dickens created in his 
twenty major novels an imaginary world that chronicles what has become "typically 
Victorian ." He was, however, a pioneer of sorts, for he chose to write about 
scenes from English life that had always been considered inappropriate for lit-
erature, "low" material as it was called. And this decision marks a departure 
not only for literature, but for Dickens, who had, with sensitive perception, 
seen changes occurring in English life, changes precipitated by increased indus-
trialization which brought new problems to England and new challenges to the 
English government . As he attacked these problems in his la t er novels, his 
numerous essays, and speeches, Dickens emerged as an effective and i nd ignant 
voice of protest against what he saw as raging social injustice and against a 
government which he began to believe was unable to cope with the problems . 
This pessimism pervades his later novels. 
The social novel surfaced in the 1830's as a partial outgrowth of the po-
litical agitation of the time. Romanticism, a dying form with its emotionalism 
and idealism, fo und a partial rebirth in political and social aspirations and a 
vehicle in the novel. l While all of Dickens ' novels reflect this growing aware-
ness of the power o[ literature in attacking social wrongs, it is his work of 
the 1840 ' s and 1850's that best illustrates Dickens' reform tendencies. By this 
time, Dickens had come to view pessimistically "his society as a muddle of greed, 
selfishness, snobbery, and bungling inefficiency,"2 and to fear the threat to 
the individual , the degradation of human spontaneity, that went hand in hand with 
the triumph of machinery and industrialization. 3 Man, he believed, was becoming 
"isolated in a world of increasing ugliness and diminishing meaning."4 In novel 
nfter novel from this period, Dickens indicted the various forces of society that 
imprison the individual; in Bleak House, the law; in Hard Times, industry; in 
Great Expectations, class; in Our Mutual Friend , money ; the great Dickens' theme 
of the individual against society emerged again and again as a poignant cry.S 
Dickens once wrote, "I am a Reformer heart and soul," but while he consis-
tently denounced the evils in his world, he never proposed feasible alternatives 
to them. 6 His crusades, however, were diverse. Maybe the best statement of 
his sympathies is found in the introduction to Household Words, a publication 
that, because of its nature, afforded Dickens, as its editor, a greater forum 
to attack social injustice. He wrote that it [Household Hords] 
consistently opposes racial, national, religious and class 
prejudices . It crusades against illiteracy, and in favor of 
government aid for public education and free elementary and 
industrial schools for the poor . It crusades for proper sew-
age disposal, cheap and unlimi ted wa ter supply, and the r egu-
lation of industries vital to health . It demands the replace-
ment of slums by decent housing for the poor , pleads for the 
Hary Lou Nathews 
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establishment 0 playgrounds for children, and advocates system-
atic municipal planning. . It insists that industrialists 
must not be a lowed to mutilate and kill their labourers in order 
to save the cost of pr venting an accident. . . . it calls upon 
the working class to use its power to turn the ' Indifferents and 
the Incapable' out of Downing Street and l-1estminister and force 
the government to remedy the ills from which poor men s uffer .7 
Obv i ously, Household Words was to be the social conscience of Vic torian England 
"nd Cha rles Dickens was to be the voice . 
I~o were the villains in Dickens ' eyes? Basically, th y were os t en tatious 
and money-grubbing men whose absence of proper values , lack of altruistic emo-
tions, and ruthless egotism had set them apart . Sometimes they were big busi-
nessmen , the new bourgeois, who advocated orthodox political economy (Ralph 
Nickleby, Scrooge , Jonas Chuzzlewit , Hr . Dombey , Gradgrind , and Bounderby) and 
who were vain and selfish, "preoccupil'd with superficial appearances and ob-
sessed with the attempt to conceal their humble origins and the novelty of 
their wealth ." S Yet, Dickens also attacks specific institutions : the legal 
system, the debtor ' s prison, schools, Parliamen t, and the Church . 
However , while Dickens criticizes society ' s institutions , h sympathizes 
with those who are the unwitting victims of them . This sympathy is first with 
children . A r e trospective gla nce at Dickens ' novels reveals a bulk of work 
obs ssed with the plight of the child . Starting wi th the autobiographical 
David Copperfield, Dickens worked child r en into his plots , often using a child 
as the center of the work. These were , however, usually not children from the 
middle class , but lost, unloved children whose lives were bleak , darkened by 
horrible experiences such as his hildhood job in a blacking factory . I t was 
this kind of exploi t a tion of childr en that Dickens a ttacked as unjust. 9 I n 
Great Expectations, Dickens wrote, 
In the lit t le world in which children have their existence, 
whosoever brings them up, there is no t hing so finely perceived 
and so finely felt as injustice . It may be only small in-
jus tice that the child can be exposed to but the child is 
small, and its world is Rmnll . lJithin myself , I had 
s ustained from my babyhood , a p rpetual conflict with in-
justice . lO 
Dickens repeatedly remind d th En~lish people that t he " seeds of i t s certain 
ruin" were sown in the negl ct of the children . He was appalled by r eports 
showing that opium was administer d to small children , and he deplored the 
negligent society that allowed 30,000 poor childr en in the stree t s of London 
to be "hunted , flogged, imprison d" while "the Priests and Teachers of al l 
denominations say ' Teach this!--Teach that! --Teach t'other--' and the Hinister 
of State, though distressed by the spec t acle shr ugged his shoulder a nd replied 
'It is a grea t wrong-- BUT IT I.1ILL l.AST ~1Y TUIE !' "11 His concern fo r children 
is further revealed in The Uncommercial Traveller : 
I could enter no other houses for that one while , for I could 
not bear the contemplation of the ch ildr en . Such heart as I 
had summoned to sustain me aga inst the miseries of the a dults 
failed me when T looked a t the childr en . I saw how young they 
were, how hungry, how serious, and still. I thought of them, 
sick and dying in those lairs . I think of them dead without 
anguish; but to think of them so suffering and so dying quite 
unmanned me. 12 
14 
However, it is not iust children who evoke such feelings in Dickens . He 
was "passionately on the side of anyone who was weak or oppressed " 13 and his 
heart "was wrung by the long hours, unhealthy conditions, and inadequate wages 
.. of the working class. "14 In a speech made at Boston on February 1, 1842, 
on one of his American tours, Dickens reflected on his faith in the people: 
I believe that Virtue shows quite as well in rags and patches 
as she does in purple and fine linen . I believe that she and 
every beautiful object in external nature, claim some sympathy 
in the breast of the poorest man who breaks his scan t y loaf of 
daily bread. I believe that she dwells rather oftener in alleys 
and by-ways than she does in courts and places .. 15 
Much of the blame for the deplorable conditions of the poor rested, Dickens 
believed, on the shoulders of Parliament. His distaste for that institution 
dates from his early career as a reporter for The Mirror of Parliament; in 1832, 
the times were exciting as the Reform Bill stirred the diverse passions in the 
English people . At that time , Dickens wrote, "we have visited it quite often 
enough [or our purposes, and a great deal too often for our personal peace and 
comfort." Later, he wrote, "I suppose it is something peculiar in my consti-
tution, but I can not imagine how any man of worth can endure the personal con-
templation of the House of Commons . "16 By the 1850's, Dickens viewed English 
government even more contemptibly. He called Parliament a "Great Dust Heap 
down at \vestminister" and "the dreariest failure and nuisance that ever bothered 
this much bothered world . "17 Government, Dickens felt, had retreated from its 
responsibilities, especially to the people whose discontent was "smoldering," 
waiting for lIanyone of a thousand accidents" to turn it into "a devil of a 
conflagra tion . " 18 Ignoring its paternalistic duties , the government was let-
ting the people subside into poverty , hunger, and lethargy. As he wrote to 
Dr. Southwood Smi th , 
. I greatly fear that until Governments are honest, and 
Parliament pure, and great men less considered, and small men 
more so, it is almost a Cruelty to even the dreadful hours and 
ways of Labor which at this time prevail. I,ant is so general , 
distress so great, and Poverty so rampant--lt is, in a word, 
so h"rd for the millions to live by any means -- that I scarcely 
know how we can step between them and one weekly farthing . 19 
Even later, in a speech at Birmingham on January 6, 1860, Dickens quoted from 
H. T. Buckle History of Civilization in England , saying that "law~ivers are nearly 
always the obstructors of SOCiety instead of the helpers . . . . " ° His general 
attitude was that those who governed were more concerned about appearances and 
official dignity than social responsibility . 2l 
Dickens ' novels from this period overflow with satire aimed at Parliament. 
The most scathing attack may appear in Bleak House where Dickens denounced corrupt 
elections and satirized an 1851 crisis when Lord John Russell resigned and no 
minister could form a Cabinet unti 1 Russell was finally returned . Dickens wrote, 
"L,>rU Cuodle would go nut, S'r Thomns Doodle wouldn't come in, and th re being 
nobody in Great Britain (to speak of) except Coodle and Doodle, there has been 
no Government ."22 Again in Nicholns Xicklebv, Dickens registered his disgust 
for Parli ment when Nicholas applied for a iob as secretary to a member of Pa r-
liament. He quickly discover d that Mr. Gre~sbury was" hypo rite; icholas 
had earlier overheard him tell a group of visitors "Thank heaven, I am a Briton 
. . .. I am proud of this free :lnd happy country ." But, wh n the visitors 
leave , h turned co "icholas and told him to get together "a few ittle flour -
ishing speeches of a patriotic cast" and to say good thing" about the people 
"b cause it comes out well at election time . "2) The only purpose of the job , 
it seemed, was to assemble facts about finance and foreign po icy to cram into 
his ignorant employer so he can make the correct speeches. In Hard Times , 
Dickens called Parliament Ita national cinder heap" and its members "national 
dustmen. ,, 24 Little Dor ritt also attacks members of Parliament who "fetched 
and carried, and toadied, and jobbed, and corrupted, and ate heaps of dirt"; 
he also satirizes government bureaucr. cy like his fictional Circumlocution 
Office , controlled by the Barna Ie family ; when a vacancy occur r ed , they pro-
posed one another for the position.25 It became an agency "dedicated to sti-
iling and suppressing all polit clll change nnd innovation . "26 n Bleak House, 
Dickens created Sir Leicest r Dedlo k, a fine old English ~entlel!k~n . "only a 
baronet , II but , "honourable obs t1 n:l te . . . intensely prejudiced nnd unreasonable 
" Sir Leicester represented those who ruled England throu gh hodies like 
the Court of Chancery ; this ba ron t "regards the Court of Chancery . . . as 
sam thing devised .. . by the perfect ion of human wisdom, fo r the eternal se t -
LJement of very thing . . To give the sanction of his count na nce to a ny 
complaints respecting it . would be to encou r age some person in th e lower classes 
to rise up somewhere .... ,, 27 An carlier passage from David Copperfield a t -
Lacked the same kind of red tapp and bureaucracy that engulfed England by com-
paring the country to a "trussed fowl ... skewer ed through and th r ough with 
c.ffiee p ns and bound hand and foot with red tape . "28 
As with many of his attacks al\ainst inius ti ees , Dickens failed to offer 
any solution to the disa reeable situation he saw in government . His f utility 
is voiced in an 1855 letter to Charles Macready : 
As to suffrage , I hay' lost hope even in the ballot . \o/e appea r 
to me to have proved the failure of representative institutions 
withou t an educated and advanced people to s upport them . 
what with flunkyism, tn dyism, lcttin~ the mos t contemptible 
lords come in for all manner of places , 1 do reluc t antly b lieve 
tha t the English p opJ e arc habi tua lly consenting parties t o 
the miserable imbecil i ty into which ,ye have fall en, a nd nev e r 
will help themselves out of it . .. At the present , we are 
on the down hi 1 road to be conquered and the people WILL not 
bear it. . I have no present political fai th or hope--not 
a grain . 29 
In addition to the government , another perpetrator of social evil was the 
c ity itself . Considered as the leading city in the world in the nine t een th 
century, London was a great comm~ rcial cnter encompassing i n its boundaries 
3 cross-section of humanity. But, Dickens tended to see a nd to po rtra y London 
as a city he called "a yost hopeless nursery of ignorance , misery and vice . "
30 
He again voiced his disgust of the city in a letter to Bulwer Lytton in 1851 
when he called London " 0 vile place ." )l This same a ttitude about the ci t y is 
---
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reflected in his novels where he associated the city with death and poverty . 
Images of an "impure river ," "a squalid maze of streets ," "miserable houses," 
"wilderness of dirt, rags, and hunger" dot the pages of his books . The ulti-
mate cure for the city's problem i s , once again , government action, but Dickens' 
London, covered with fog and infected by polluted water, could get no aid from 
a Chancery and a Parliament that he believed resisted any change. 32 
Dickens did, however , become active in the movement to provide sanitation 
and public housing for London . Responding to graphic and shocking reports 
about public sanitation, Parliament finally established a General Board of 
Health in 1848. However, the Board proved inefficient, stymied by petty quar -
rels and administrative infighting . The lurking dan er was cholera , which 
annually threatened the city . In fact, 1848 brought a serious outbreak that 
killed 14,000 in London alone, but, ironically, the Board exacerbated the situ-
at ion by flushing the drains, an act which made the infection waterborne . 
Dickens became involved in the public health crusade through his brother-in-
law , Henry Austin, who was secretary of the Hetropolitan Sanitary Conunission, 
and Dr . Thomas Southwood Smith , a friend who was also active in the movement. 
After this outbreak of cholera , Dickens wrote several scathing articles in 
The Examiner and in Household Hords, and he began to make speeches, campaigning 
actively for improved conditions. "Education and religion can do nothing where 
they are most needed," Dickens argued, "unti l the ,yay is paved for their min-
istrations by Cleanliness and Decency," In his fiction, he also treated the 
subject. Dombey and Son and Bleak House both advocated improved sanitation. 
The Board of Health eventually died along with the Palmerston ministry in 1854, 
but Dickens continued his advocacy of reform. In fact , his later essays in 
Household \Yords on the subj ec t ring wi th radical though t. Unfortuna tely, while 
he was able to draw attention to the problem , he was not successful in finding 
an effective remedy for it . 33 
At the same time Dickens was lobbyin~ for sanitary reform, he was also 
interested in public housing . Believing that Door housing indirectly caused 
physical and m~ntal illness that crippled the poor , Dickens turned Bleak House 
and Household Hords into a platform for various housing reforms. He convinced 
Miss Angela Burdette Coutts with whom he had worked in her Urania College, a 
home for "fallen 'vornen," to .ioin in a project t o build workingmen 1 s housing . 
\..]ith some friends, Dickens chose a site, known as Nova Scotia Gardens, and 
hired an a rc hitect; at the same time, Miss Coutts purchased the land. The 
project , underway at the same time Bleak House was, proposed to build clean , 
inexpensive housing for the poor . However, because of money difficulties, the 
project was stalled for a short time, but Nova Scotia Gardens project was com-
pleted in 1859 . Later , Miss Coutts built another project adjacent to the first 
one. Ironically , none of the model d,,/elling projects actually alleviated the 
crowded housing situation. l"hen the model dwellings were built , they rehoused 
fewer people than they had evicted . For example, the IHld Court renovation 
project evicted around 1000 people, but rehoused only about three to four hun-
dred of th em. True to Dickens I form , he \.,;ras once again instrumental in defining 
" serious problem, but his lack o( understanding of housing problems hampered 
the actual solution o( the problem . 34 
Other targets of Dickens' crusading were the Poor Law and the workhouses 
filled by that law . l"hile Dickens declared that he was in sympathy with the 
intentions of the Poor Law--to cut down on able-bodied pauperism--he deplored 
its abuses . In a postscript to Our Mutual Friend , he wrote. "I believe there 
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has heen in England, since the days of the Stuarts, no law so often infamous-
ly adminis t ered , no lat, so often openly violated, no law so habitually i11-
supervised .,,35 In Oliver Twist, Dickens attacked the Poor Law and its admin-
istration . Hr . Bumble, the padsh headle , runs t he workhouRe, an ac t that 
was in violation of the spirit of the law : the framers of this law were sus-
picious of the beadles, and , wanting to see them intelligently administered , 
provided official for workhouses. However, many parishes simply rehired the 
beadles and provided them with new labels . This one, Hr. Bumble, reduced the 
children 's diet to thin gruel, a nother violation of the law which required that 
children should get nutritious food : only able- bodied paupers were to be kept 
on thin gruel . 36 One of the most dramatic scenes in Oliver Twis t depicts this 
mistreatment : 
The gruel disappeared: the boys whispered t o each other and 
winked at Oliver while his next neighbors nudged him. Child 
as he was, he was desperate with hunger, and reckless with 
misery . He rose from the table; and advancing to the master, 
basin and spoon in hand , said : somewha t ala rmed at his own 
temerity : 'P lease ~ Sir, I want some more. I 
Oliver's request for more food was treated as rebellion by the masters : 
The assistants wer paralyzed with wonder: the boys with fea r 
. the master . . . shr; eked aloud for the beadle . The 
boa rd were sitting in solemn conclave when Hr . Bumble rushed 
i nto the room in quiet excit ment , and addressing the gentle-
man in the high hair said , ' Mr. Limbkins, I beg your pardon, 
Sir ! Oliver Twist has asked for more !' There was a gene r al 
start; Horror was depicted on every countenance . . . 'That 
boy will be hung ,' said the gen tleman in t he white waistcoat . 37 
Other than this mistreatment of the children , Dickens also denounced the Parish ' s 
refusal to give relief outside its walls . In all, Dickens saw the workhouse as 
"a conglomeration of church wardens and overseers, the instigators and the per-
petrators of a bad system. Here th human spirit is systematically ground and 
punished into subjection .,, 38 
Critical , then, of the State's cfforts to provide relief, Dickens turned 
to the church, and on church charity , he vented the same a nger and f rustration . 
The church, Dickens fe lt, was too concerned with people in other countries in-
stead of those at home who had the same needs . A poignant argument for this 
idea was advanced in the character of Jo in Bleak House : 
It must be a strange state to be like Jo! To shuffle through 
the streets, unfamiliar with the shapes , and in utter darkness 
as to the meaning of those mysterious symbols, so abundant over 
the shops, and at the corners of the streets and on the doors, 
and in the windows! ... Jo ... sits down to breakfast on 
the door- step of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
in Foreign Parts, and gives it a brush when he has finis hed, 
as an acknowledgement of the accomoda tion. He admires the size 
of the edifice, and wonders what it's all about . He has no idea, 
poor wretch, of th spiritual desti tu tion of a coral reef in the 
Pacific , or what it costs to l ook up the precious souls among the 
cocoa-nut s a nd bread fruit. 39 
• 
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At Jo's death, Dickens interjected himself into the book, saying "Dead, your 
Hajesty. Dead, my 10rdR nnd I\entlemen . Dead, Ril\ht Reverends and wrong Rev-
erends of every order . Dead, men and women, born with Heavenly compassion in 
your hearts. And dying thus around us every day."40 The statement is a vicious 
indictment o[ the church and the state who ignore the poverty and starvation 
that surround them both. 
Another social question that gripped Dickens' attention was drinking. He 
quarrelled with his contemporaries who averred that drinking caused social evils. 
Dickens disagreed, saying tha t poor people were no t "inherently evil, but they 
are driven by their poverty to commit social crimes." He urged others to exam-
ine the causes of drinking instead: 
Foul smells, disgusting habitations, bad workshops, and workshop 
customs, want of light, air and water, the absence of all easy 
means of decency and health are .. . its common, everyday physi-
cal causes. The mental weariness .::md languor so induced, the 
want of wholesome relaxation, the craving for some stimulus and 
excitement ... and last, and inclusive of all the rest, igno-
rance . .. are its most obvious moral causes. 4l 
Solve these problems, Dickens claimed, and the drinking problem would disappear. 
As a cure for many social problems, Dickens sU$1;l\ested education, but when 
he surveyed the kind of educa tion offered to children, he was disappointed. The 
schools in Dickens' fiction illustrate what he considered as evils in educating 
the young. In Nicholas Nickleby, Dickens described Dotheboys Hall as an "incip-
ient Hell." Dr. Blimber's Academy in Dombey and Son was more respectable but 
eDually as blighting since it taught a superficial layer of knowledge that al-
lowed the teacher to show off the child and his amount of learning. Finally, 
in Hard Times, the Gradgrind school demanded purely factual responses to ques-
tions. Dickens, in fact, titled the schoolroom scene in that book "Hurdering 
the Innocents," because at Gradgrind' s school, ca tering to the lower classes, 
an assembly line atmosphere prevailed. In each of these schools, teachers had 
no recognition of a child's emotional and intellectual needs: it was this blind-
ness to "Fancy," as Dickens called it, that he feared . 42 
But while Dickens was concerned about all types of schooling, his greatest 
reform efforts were directed toward the Ragged Schools. a movement initiated 
by evangelicals to educate slum children. His interest in these schools dated 
from 1843 when he visited Field Lane School. l""i1e he supported the Ragged 
School endeavor , he did have cer tain misgivings. The schools were ill-equipped 
and underfunded. He wrote to Hiss Coutts after his visit to one that he had 
visited Ragged School and an awful sight it is . The school 
is held in thr(>e most wretched rooms on the first floor of a 
rotten house. . . . T have very seldom seen, in all the strange 
and dreadful things t have seen in London and elsewhere, anything 
so shocking as the dire neglect of the soul and body exhibited 
in these children. The children are travelling to their 
graves. 43 
Dickens praised the teachers, volunteers who gave their free time to teach, for 
their "moral courage," especially in view of the "disheartening circumstances" 
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of the school . Also upset by the emphasis of religious instruction, he wrote, 
liTo impr~ss them, even with the idea of a God , when th ir own condition is so 
desolate, becomes a monstrous task . " Deciding , however, that the Ragged Schools 
were better than nothing , "a slight and ineffec tua l palliative of an enormous 
evil," he became a s upporter of th · m in Household Hords, encouraging people t o 
visit Lhem and subscribe , a plea to which many favorably responded . 44 Hoping 
for fur the r support , Dickens wrote an nrticle for the Daily News on Februar y 
4, 1846 in which he tried to explain the purposes of the schools : 
. to introduce among t he most miserable and neglected out-
cas ts in London, some knowledge of the commonest principles of 
morality and religion; to commence their recognition as immortal 
creatur es before the Gaol Chaplain becomes their only school-
master; to suggest to Soc iety that its duty to this wretched 
throng, foredoomed to crim and punishment , rifhtfully begins 
at some distance from the police office .. .. 5 
He valued these schools, chen as a preventive to juvenile crime and later social 
misbehavior. 
The Ragged School exp rience met with bitter opposition , but Dickens per -
severed, writing frequently about the schools in his Household Words and sending 
a continual flow of lett ers to the Daily News . Even though his last fictional • 
referenc t o the schools is an uncomp limentary one , he continued t o support 
t hem as a prelude to more far reachin,,- ed uc;) tional a nd social reforms . ' 
The Ragged Schools did not stand alone in Dickens ' condemnation . Because 
of their inefficiency, charity schools , which among o ther complaints required 
that their students wear uniforms, also became a Dickensonian target . Wearing 
a uniform, Dickens believed, marked a child as a charity case and thus isolated 
him from other children. Tn Dombey and Son, Dickens crea t ed Robin, who, because 
he wore a charity school uniform, was harassed by other children as he went back 
and forth to school . 46 \4orkhouse schools were even worse in Dickens ' mind. 
In Household \40rds , he described a visit to a workhouse school , saying tha t he 
was "oppressed by the general air of lassistude and hopelessness, of stern dis -
cipline and poor feeding . " His gonl fo r these schools was to get them to teach 
industrial and farm trajning to the boys and domestic training to the gir ls. 47 
lfuat was the solution to these ducational dilemmas that Dickens a nguished 
ove r? While he did not favor a syst m t otally administered by the state, he 
did want the sta t e to insure that all chi ldren go t a minimum education . He 
explained his attitude about reform in Household Hords: 
To endow such Institutions and leave the question of National 
Education in its present shameful s tate would be to maintain 
a cruel absurdity to which we a r e most strongly opposed. The 
compulsory industrial education of neglected children and the 
severe punishment of neglectful and unnatural parents are re-
forms to which we must come . 14e can no more hope to make 
any g reat impressions upon crime, without these changes , than 
we could hope to stop the eruption of Ht . Vesuvius with a water-
ing pot or stop its flow with a knitting needle . 48 
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Even though Charles Dickens W8S aware of many social injustices existing 
in England, he never lost his faith in his country . While he was on his American 
trip in 1842 , he wrote a letter pI dging , "I lov" England better than I did when 
I left her, " and in .::another letter, he said, " .. . T have .1 yearning after our 
English Cus t oms a nd English manners, s uch as you cannot conceive . "49 \~hat he 
tried to do, then, in his novels a nd other writings was not destroy the system , 
bu t to bring about r eforms , believing that man could improve himself . \,JlJile 
he could no t be classified as a practical reformer , he can be credited with 
exposing a huge audience to social problems that they had previously ignored. 
Some of his con temporaries cri ticized his approach to social reform. For exam-
ple, Thomas Carlyle scorned Dickens, taunting that his " solution to social and 
political wrongs was t o dress up as Father Christmas and dole out enormous tur-
keys to impoverished victims of laissez- faire capitalism ."SO But, maybe the 
practicality of his solutions is not what is really important . "Ah, sir," said 
a cabby s hortly after Dickens ' death, "Mr. Dickens was the gentlema n who looked 
after the poor man . "Sl And , in looking after the poor man, Dickens became the 
outspoken advocate of the individual trapped by a sys t em that ignored, even 
trampled, him , a system that caused the early death of the Stephen Blackpools 
who called life "a muddle" and who had to die to find "the God of t he poor ."S 2 
The dark and bleak world of Dickens ' novels portrayed the kind of society he 
thought Engl and had become . That grim, sordid world both outraged and bewil-
dered him , but it did not dim his haunting vision of a more humane world where 
the cries of the Dlivers, the Jos , the Stephens, and the Davids would no longer 
go unheeded . 
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TO HELL WITH HABEAUS CORPUS 
A unique experience occurred in American history beginning on March 24, 
1942 with the removal and later incarceration of over 80,000 Japanese- American 
citizens . Never before had the President of the United States , by Executive 
Order, allowed the civil liberties of a minority group of citizens to be vio-
lated in this manner . These people were not inJividually accused of a crime 
and were not afforded the constitutional guarantee of a trial. They were in-
terned as a gro up because of a myriad of complex reasons compounded by events 
beginning with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. 
Since World War II historians have agreed that the agitating forces for 
this mass resettlement were the military, politicians, and pressure groups. 
The primary motivations were fear, greed, and racism . In order to understand 
the magnitude of the decision, an exami nation of historical literature over 
the past fifteen years shows that it is impossible to conclude that anyone, 
or even two, of these groups could have accomplished such a feat . It took all 
of them working in concert to produce Executive Order 9066 and the resulting 
internment of so many American citizens. 
Fear, racism, and greed on the part of pressure groups prompted politicians 
to demand action from the military, a nd the military, with its own concern over 
the protection of the West Coast military installations and fear of invasion , 
completed the circle by instilling fear in the pressure groups . These pressure 
groups fall roughly into three categories : racist, economic , and patriotic . 
The most powerful spokesman for the patriots was the American Legion . Economic 
groups representing anti - Japanese sentiments were the Grower- Shipper Vegetable 
Associations of Central California, the Western Growers and Shippers, the Cali-
fornia Farm Bureau Federation, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, and the 
Los Angeles Merchants and Manufacturers . The r acist element voiced many of 
its cries through the Native Sons of the Golden ',est and the California Joint 
Immigration Committee. 
The Yellow Peril attitude of the racists toward the Chinese was transferred 
to the Japanese immigrants as early as 1900. Even though there were only 24,326 
Japanese in the entire United States, they were pictured by the West Coast States 
as hordes of coolies . They were viewed as tricky, unreliable, and dishonest 
people who were taking jobs from White Americans. Anti- Japanese propaganda in-
creased during the Russo- Japanese War and by June , 1905 the anti-Japanese forces 
consolidated into the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League . Many of the League 
members and officials also belonged to the Native Sons of The Golden West, an 
organization dedicated to exclusion or Orientals. l 
By 1920 aliens were forbidden to lease land, to purchase stock in any organ-
ization which owned or leased agricultural land, and they were no longer allowed 
to purchase land in the name of their citizen children . By 1923 this land law 
was extended to prohibit Japanese aliens from sharecropping . Shortly before 
the Immigration Act of 1924 another organization was formed which consisted of, 
among others, the Grand President of the Native Sons of The Golden West , Mr. 
V.S. MCClatchy. McClatchy was also editor and owner of the racist newspaper, 
Mary B. McCracken 
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t he Sac ramento Bee . This new orga nization , the California Joint Immigration 
Committee, became by 1927 the most power f ul single r acist group in California. 
Th i s nativist organization made sure that exclusion a ga inst the Japanes e was 
r e ta ined . . When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, these anti-Japanese forces 
of the West Coa st began to talk in terms of non- assimilation and the " un-
Americanism" of dual citizens hip . 2 After Pea rl Harbor the xenophobia of many 
white Californians shar ed the Immigration Committ e e ' s view that the Japanese 
problem was now a national one and , like the Na tive Sons, decided it was time 
to ge t done what should have been a ccompli s h ed a quarter of a century ago . 3 
The sur prise a tta ck on Pearl Harbor gave credence to racist groups ' views 
that the Japanese were a sneaky, diabolical race of people. This was quickly 
becoming the West Coast ' s opinion in December of 1941 where over 117,000 Japanese 
lived in wha t would later be termed as military areas. Because of physical 
appearance and cultural differences, the alien and Japanese- American citizens 
were thought of as a mass group a nd no t as individuals . The immigrant alien 
Issei, the Japanese educa t ed Kibei, and the American born Nisei were considered 
s t ill l oyal to the Emperor . They would fight for their country either in front 
of or behind enemy lines . 4 Associate Supreme Court Jus tice Owen J . Rober t s, 
Chairman of President Roosevelt ' s special investigating commission on the cause 
of t he disaster a t Pea rl Harbor, indicated that the attack was pla nned well 
befor e Japan broke diplomatic relations with the United States and was aided 
by f ifth column activities in Hawaii . 5 The Rober ts Report added impe t us t o 
West Coast pressure groups wh o insisted it was impossible to di stinguish be-
tween loyal a nd disloyal Japanese . 
The question o f loyalty i ntensified in mi d- Feb ruary of 1942 as the allies' 
mi litary situation con t inued to deteriorate in the Pacific . 
Japan . . . had taken most of the Phillipines , Hong Kong, 
Thailand, Wake and Guam Island s , Surawak, Tarakan , and o t her 
sections of Borneo, Moulmein in Burma, outlying Du t ch and 
Australian possessions , and the Malay Peninsula up to 
Singapor e Is l and - and Singapore was to surrender on the 
fifteenth of February.6 
Losses in the Pacific coincided with several s trong anti - Japanese press releases. 
On February 5, 1942 the House on Un-American Activities , or the Dies Commi t tee, 
released its "YellmoJ Paper" revealing West Coast f ifth column activi ty. Walter 
Lip pman , on February 12, wrot e D syndicated column t itled "The Fif t h Column on 
the Coast. " His opinion was that since there was no important sabo t age as yet 
on the Coast, that such activities we re being held back for one tremendous 
attack. As a result of the gravity of the si tua tion, Lippman advoca t ed se t -
ting aside the civil rights of Japanese- American ci t izens . Four days la t er 
Eastern columnist \1es tbrook Pegler, a conservative right- wing journalis t , wrote 
that all Japanese in California should be under armed guard and " to he l l wi th 
habeaus corpus . "7 
Racism , fed by war hys t eria , soon began to have i t s affect on economic 
specia l interest gr oups . The whole sale prod uce markets in Los Angeles wan t ed 
to eliminate their Japanese competitors. II Whi t e American" nur serymen or ganized 
a boycott of Japanese firms . 8 The Grower - Shipper Associa tion , wh ich was almost 
a subsidiary of the large r Wes t ern Gr owers, published a br ochure en t i tl ed NO 
J APS NEEDED to assure Californians they would not go hungr y wi t hout t he Japanese 
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truck farmers. This Ifhite growers association leased lands which produced fresh 
vegetables the year around in Salinas , Imperial and Salt River Valleys for East-
ern markets, as did the Japanese . The Salinas Valley alone produced half of 
the head lettuce sold in the country ' s produce markets. 9 
The extent to which the Japanese were cutting into White farmers and 
laborers was examined in a series of hearings by Congressman John H. Tolan 
and the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration in the West 
Coast Area. According to the Tolan Committee Report, Japanese farming occupied 
43 percent of the gainfully employed in the th r ee Pacific States and 24 percent 
were engaged in wholesale and retail trades.lO In 1941 California-Japanese 
farmers grew 42 percent of the State acreage in commercial truck crops which 
was valued at approximately $100,000,000 for both the fresh market and pro-
cessing . The Japanese operated 3 . 9 percent of all farms in the State. They 
harvested only 2.7 percent of all cropland, but as laborers and owners they 
produced : 
Ninety percent or more of the following crops: snapbeans for 
marketing; celery , spring and summer; peppers; strawberries. 
Fifty to ninety percent of the following: artichokes; snap-
beans for canning; cauliflower; celery, fall and winter; cu-
cumbers; fall peas; spinach; tomatoes. Twenty- five to fifty 
percent of the following : asparagus, cabbage, cantaloupes, 
carrots, lettuce, onions, and watermelons . ll 
It is significant to note that these percentages represent in monetary 
value between 30 and 35 percent of all commercial truck crops grown in 
California . 12 Considering the monetary value of the Japanese commercial 
truck crops, it is important to relate this to the location of the farms 
in California and t he economic pressure groups "ho demanded Japanese relo-
cation. 
Nearly 30 percent of all commercial truck farms were located in Los Ang p -
les County, while almost 85 percent were in Alameda, Fresno, Imperial, Monterey, 
Orange, Peaser, Sacramento, San Diego, San Joaquin, Santa Clara and Tulare. 13 
It was from these counties that much of the anti-Japanese agitation arose. 
1·lith the outbreak of the war, the California State Farm Bureau appointed a 
committee to investigate the Japanese problem . Following the investigation, 
the Bureau recommended that all alien and citizen Japanese be put under fed -
e ral supervision . In February the Los Angeles County directors of the Farm 
Bureau unanimously passed a resolution stating that all alien and citizen 
Japanese be confined to concentration camps jn the interest of national de-
fense. 14 The loss of Japanese agricultural products was not a factor to many. 
Representing the agriculturists in Monterey County, H.L. Strobel told the 
Tolan Committee : 
I believe that the American farmers, or the farmers of California, 
are entirely capable, and with the land now occupied by Japanese, 
will produce in just as large a quantity the vegetables that 
have been formerly produced by the Japanese in our farming 
areas. 15 
The California Chambers of Commerce concurred with the California Farm 
Bureau. The California Chambers of Commerce through its Agricultural Committee 
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recommended on De cember 22 , 1941 that al l Ja pa nese nationals be pu t under fed -
eral control . In February the Los Angeles chapter as a group went on record 
as ad voca ting the removal of all Japanese to an a r ea some fif ty miles from the 
Coast and the Mexican border . 16 Removal of the Japan ese would be advantageous 
not only t o the Hhi t e farme r but also to the wh olesale and r e tail business in 
Los Angeles . The largest metropolitan produce distributing cent er west of 
Chicago was located in Los Angeles and controlled by a Japa nese syndicate . 17 
The California a ttitud e toward t his situation and the Japanese fa rmer is best 
described in the Tolan Commit tee hearing by a representative of the Associa ted 
Produce Dealers and Brokers of Los Angeles : 
I have talked to ma ny wholesale growers of vegetables 
for the local market who have either gone out of business in 
the past t e n yea r s or gr ea tl y r educed thei r operations due 
to Japanese competition . 
A compr ehensive system of associat ions se t up for these 
s mal l Japanese farmers has enabled them to regulate market 
s upplies and reduce pri ces at will , to the point the Hhite 
growe r has been fo rced out of product i on . However, th ere 
i s a vast reserve of s killed \.Jhite f armers who will resume 
the pr oduction of vege t ables wh enever they ha ve any idea 
tha t it can be do ne withou t goi ng up a gainst this t ype of 
Japanese competition ... . 18 
An analysis of what the Japa nese lost mone tarily as a result of evacuation 
shows "hat the economic groups had t o ga in from Japanese relocation . According 
to H. R. A. Chief of Evacue e Property, Mr . Russell Robinson, the Japanese left 
some $200,000 , 000 worth of rea l , personal a nd commercial property . Many lea se-
holding fa rm evacuees lost thes e l eases to other races. In 1945 Japanese farm 
ownership was about 30 percent of their t otal pre- war fa rm operations . \{hat 
rema ined fo r the tota l pre- war Japanese l andholders and leaseholders was about 
60,000 acres or less than 0 . 002 of all fa rms in the Hest Coast States . 19 This 
is more than a considerab le loss of acreage . The pr e - war land acreage in Cali -
fornia , Hashing ton, a nd Or egon was 258 . 074 acres . 20 In order for the \.)es t 
Coas t economic groups t o a ssume Japanese land and other holdings , which could 
only be accomplished by their evacuation, it was necessary t o put pressure on 
their pol iticians. 
The f irst official body to make is s ue of the alien and Japanese American 
c itizen was the Ca li fo rnia legisla ture . On January 17 , 1942 the Senate passed 
two resolutions : one called for an inves tiga tion of the California Alien Land 
Law a nd th e seco nd for the creation of an investiga ting commi ttee to s tudy em-
ployment of Japanese-American ci t izens by the State . The first resolution 
argued that t he l<lh ite and Oriental races were socially and economical l y incom-
patible. It also pointed out tha t aliens we r e in control of large land areas 
near vital i nstallations whi ch created a menace to national defense, citizens 
of the State, nation, and th e American vegetable and fruit grower a nd dealer. 
The second r esolution was to prevent em ployment of anyone who proved disloyal 
t o the United States . This measure was directed a t worke r s who possessed dua l 
c itizenship- - in other words , tl1e Ja pane se . 2l 
The f irst resolution concerning the Alien Land Law is not d i fficu l t to 
understand considering t he pre ssure from racists and eco nomic gr oups . However, 
• 
• 
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the second resolution concerning employm~nt of the disloyal is more complex. 
The situation that many politicians found themselves in can perhaps best be 
seen through California Attorney General Earl Warren's statement a few weeks 
after Pearl Harbor. He said, "The Japanese situation ... may well be the 
Achilles' heel of the entire civilian defense effort."22 On February 2, 
Warren told a conference of Sheriffs and district attorneys that the lack 
of fifth column activity and sabotage made it appear that the Japanese were 
waiting until "the zero hour arrived. "Z3 However, on February 7, \.Jarren wrote 
Assemblyman Thomas A. Maloney concerning the legality of the state Personnel 
Bonrd barring from Civil Service examina tions anyone 'vho descended from na-
tionals of countries with which the United States was at war. \,]arren stated 
the refusal to accept these people was discriminatory and a violation of civil 
liberties . 24 But 1942 was an election year for many politicians and for Earl 
Warren a governorship was pending . 
\,arren did not have a real state political machine, so sheriffs end dis-
trict attorneys of California were his r eal political base. 25 During the 
February conference, \'arren was able to feel out his own constituents and to 
get the temper of Californians at the local level. Two weeks later when he 
testified before the Tolan Committee, "arren was less concerned with civil 
liberties and more concerned with sabotage, espionage, the inability to deter-
mine the loyal from the disloyal Japanese, and the possibility of vigilante 
action . 
At the San Francisco Tolan Committee hearings, Warren testified : 
Thr oughout the Santa Maria Valley and including the cities 
of Santa ~~ria and Guadalupe every utility, airfield, bridge, 
telephone, and power line or other facility of importance, is 
flanked by Japanese, and even surround the oil fields in this 
area . . . law enforcement officers do not know which of these 
Japanese are American citizens and which are aliens. 26 
As part of his prepared statement, Warren read before the Committee a communica-
tion from C. B. Harrall, Chief of Police of Los Angeles, on the question of loyalty: 
After thorough and complete investigation of the relationship 
existing between parents and children , and the tendencies of 
the American-born Japanese, 1 feel that they present as diffi-
cult, if not more difficult, problem than the enemy alien . 27 
\vanen also commen t ed on the possibility of vigi lante action : 
there are many, many Japanese who are now roaming a round 
the \vestern States in a condition that will unquestionably 
bring about race riots and prejudice and hysteria and excesses 
of all kinds . 28 
All of the groups represented at the Tolan Committee hearings who expressed 
these same fears as Warren believed that complete evacuation was necessary for 
the protection of the Japanese and because it was a military necessity.29 
During the second week in January, public pressure began to react a t a higher 
level . 
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Congressman Leland Ford of Los Angeles became the first politician on the 
national level to become involved in t he Japa nese question. After receiving a 
letter f rom a prominent, though not named , Hol l ywood actor sugges ting legisla -
tion to remove all Japanese truck farmers f r om the California coastline inland, 
Ford wr ote Secretary of State Cordell Hull and seven o ther executive officials 
that he agreed with t he proposal . He was informed by Attorney General Francis 
Biddle that this was not possible unless the writ of habea us corpus was s us-
pended . Ford then suggested the Army and Navy be given the authority to remove 
a ll persons who might be harmful t o the safe t y a nd wel fare of the coun try from 
s tra tegic areas . By February 9, Ford was advocating mass internment. 30 
Until February 2 , 1942 , the West Coast congressmen like For d were acting 
on t he Japanese problem alone . On J a nuary 30 , 1942 , a t a Los Angeles Chamber 
of Conunerce meeting several \.Jest Coast congressmen \.Jere i nvi ted to hear address-
es given by Charl es Nardoff , co- a uthor of Mutiny On the Bounty, and Ca p tain 
Lowell Li mpus , a newspape r columnist . Bo th speakers urged for evacuation o f 
al l Japanese . The result of this mee ting was the Costello Resolution which 
was presented before a congress ional ca uc us asking the \.Jar Department to have 
immediate and complete charge over all al ien enemies and those holding dual 
citizenship . It also cal l ed for mass evacuation of al l e nemy aliens and their 
families. Those people holding dual c itizenshi p woul d be given the opportunity 
a nd federal assis t a nce for voluntary rese ttlement . 31 
Three days later t he enti re \,est Coas t Congr essiona l Delegation met . Sen-
a t or Hiram Johnson appoint ed two committees fr om the I,est Coast delegation . 
Senator Ruf us C. Holman of Oregon headed the commi tt ee for defense of the West 
Coast, a nd Sena t or C. H I l gren of I,ashing ton was head of the commit t ee dealing 
with enemy a liens and sabotage con trol of the I,est Coas t. Senator Hallgren ' s 
c ommit t ee eliminated the question of citizenship and based its decision on 
loyalty alone . It recommended using the authority of the Army for partia l or 
comple t e evacua tion of s trategic areas which would be determined by the mili -
tary . Senator Holman ' s committee recommended t he immed i a te evacua t ion of al l 
persons of Japanese lineage and all o th e rs , al i ens and citizens , considered 
dangerous from s tra t egic areas . This committee considered the entire states 
of Cali fornia , Oregon, Hashington , and Alaska a s strategic areas . These recom-
mendati ons dated February 13, 1942 were se nt t o President Roosevel t. 32 
There were ma ny interrelating factors that caus ed th e I,e st Coast co ngress-
men to make such strong recommendations to t he Pr esiden t of the United States . 
As already indicated , pressure groups motivated by fear, racism , and gr eed , 
wer e increasingl y pe rsis t ent . Local officials a nd pol i t ical figures through 
sincer e concern and the desire to pacify their constituents pressed fo r a solu-
tion t o t he Japanese problem. The news merlia fanned t he emo t ional spark of 
fea r i n t o a r ag ing flame . The war in the Pacific was going badly for the Allies . 
Wes t Coast Americans were r apidly losing confidence in t he Federal Burea u of 
Investiga tion a nd the Department of Justice to ha ndle the Japanese pr oblem. 
To satisfy these people there was onlv one recourse-- to decla r e th e Japanese 
problem a military necessity . On Feb ruary 19 , 1942 , Roosevelt issued Execu-
tive Order No . 9066 which gave the Secre tary of I,ar and those military command-
ers he might designate t he right t o declare any a rea they deemed necessa r y as 
strategic and remove a ny pe r son therein . 33 Secretary of Har St imson assigned 
the \.Jes tern Defense Comma nder , General John L . Dewitt , t o carry out the Execu-
rive Order . 
I 
I 
I 
• 
• 
• 
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General Del'itt was affected by the agitatinl\ groups in their demand for 
the removal of all Japanese from the West Coast and, in his desire to protect 
the West Coast area, he also had an affect on the agitating groups . The two 
common elements the agitating groups shared with the West Coast military were 
racism and the geographic concentration of the Japanese. 
As early as January 29, 1942, DeWitt agreed with Admiral Truma, head of 
Lhc West Coast Naval Defense, that all aliens and Japanese-American citizens 
should be removed from Bainbridge Island because of the shipbuilding plant 
Lhere. 34 Concerning this issue, DeWitt reported to General Provost Marshal 
Gullion the same day: " ... but you know there is one group and a large 
group want to move them entirely out of the State, another group wants to 
move them to the Middle I~est . ... ,,35 This "large group" which was secretly 
organizing as a special interest group to force federal action was the West 
Coast congressmen . 36 These congressmen and coastal political leaders aided 
the military geographic argument. The previously- cited statement by I~arren 
to the Tolan Committee on February 21, 1942 is almost identically worded in 
DeWitt's June 5, 1943 "Final Report" to the I~ar Department on the Japanese 
evacuation . Del~itt then stated: 
Throughout the Santa Maria Valley and including the cities of 
Santa ~~ria and Guadalupe every utility, airfield, bridge , 
telephone, and power lin or other facility of importance 
is flanked by Japanese. 37 
The geographic concent ration of Japanese aliens and citizens bred concern 
in Lhe military when coupled with the [ear of sabotage and possible invasion 
of the I~est Coast. Be t ween December 20 Lo December 23, 1941, Japanese sub-
marines fired on three American tankers and one freighter, sinking the tanker 
Emidis. On January 25, 1942, enemy submarines were again sighted off the Pa-
cific coast. 38 These events tended to support Del~itt's December 11, 1941 an-
nouncement that there were 34 Japanese ships between San Francisco and Los 
Angeles; also, the December 13 rumor that the main Japanese fleet was 164 miles 
off San Francisco . However, DeWitt's reports were never documented . 39 
DeWitt was convinced that an invasion was imminent and the 20 ,000 Japanese 
in the San Francisco Bay area would rise to support Japan . On December 19 , 1941, 
he passed these concerns to Washlngton and recommended that all enemy aliens 
be interned. This proposal for all enemy aliens was never acted upon because 
of obvious political reasons. There were approxima t ely 700,000 Italian and 
300,000 German aliens in the Hest Coast area . 40 As late as January 31, 1942, 
DeWitt was still pushing for evacuation of all enemy aliens on the West Coast 
35 a preventive action against sabotage; only, by this date he included Japanese-
American citizens as well. 1 
On February 3, 1942, Del<itt talked to Chief of Staff General George C. 
~~rshall. After a conference with the Governor of California and several rep-
resentatives from the Departments of Justice and Agriculture, DeWitt told 
Marshall that the people of Cali fornia were very disturbed over the aliens and 
w.1nted lo get them out of several communities . DeWitt indicated his only con-
cern was the protection of military installations . The same day Assistant 
Secretary of I~ar John McClov admonished DeWi t t not to discuss wholesale evacu-
ntion of Japanese citizens and aliens with political figures. DeWitt then 
told ~fcCloy of his telephone conversation ,dth General Marshall in which Marshall 
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concurred in advoca ting removal of Japanese aliens from areas i n California 
which were considered combat zones. According to DeWitt this movement would 
be accomplished with th e aid of Cali fo rnia Governor Culbert L. 01son. 42 
Five days prior t o these t\W conversations with the IJa r Department, the 
Attorney General, on DeWitt ' s recomme nda ti on, began designating prohibited zones 
containing vi tal installations . l,ithin a few d,ays the r e were 99 s uch zones 
whi ch were off limits t o all a liens of enemy nationality . The largest of these 
zone s were the waterfronts of San Franc isco , San Diego, Wilmington , and Terminal 
Island. Aside from these military a reas the re was a lar ge portion of Los Angeles 
City and County, amounting to a 40 sq uare mile area whic h was also now classi-
f ied as a prohibited area . 43 After the Attorn ey General ' s action, it seems 
reasonable that the military and those West Coast people who so greatly feared 
invasion, esp i onage, and sabotage would be pacified ; however, this was no t a 
reasonable time . By th e second week in February all groups advocating the re-
mova l of enemy aliens and Japa nese-Ameri ca n citizens intensified their actions 
on both the War Department and the Justice Department . 
Bowing t o pressure, Attorney Genera l Biddle established 135 separate areas 
in Califo rnia , Oregon, l,ashington, and Arizona as prohibited areas t o a ll enemy 
a li ens by February 15. He a lso declared a curfew for reconstructed a r eas for 
all enemy aliens and placed travel restric tions of five miles from their homes. 44 
These actions did not please West Coas t economi~ groups, politiCians, or the 
military . California farmers did no t want more Japa nese moving in t o their lands 
a nd c ited sabotage and fear of vigilantism as their r easons . 45 Wes t Coast poli-
ticians were not eager t o disrupt the la r ge number of Ge rman and Italian alie ns . 
The military wa s concerned over Biddle ' s lack of total exclusion from mos t of 
the West Coast air cr aft factories. Biddle woul d not acquiesce because he held 
to the premise tha t his Department did not ha ve the constitutional right to go 
further . 46 
Once Biddle refused to exceed his authority as Attorney General of the 
United States other means had to be found to remove those who were the cause 
of West Coast fea r , ra cism, and gr eed- -the Japanese- American ci ti zen . On 
December 11, 1941, Chief of Staff General George C. Ma r shall declared the West 
Coast and Alaska a "Theater of Opera t ions." Biddle wrote to Secretary of Wa r 
Stimson on February 12, 1942 , tha t the evacua t ion of Japa nese citizens would 
have t o be based on military considerations which was the responsibility of 
the Army, not t he Justice Department . 4 7 Unknowingly , both Marshall and Biddle 
se t the ac t i on for the final travesty . Two days before Biddle ' s le tt er t o 
Stimson, Tom Clark from the Justice Depar tment, Los An geles Mayor Fletcher 
Bowr an , Cali fornia Attorney General Warren , and Ge nera l DeWit t met to settle 
the Japanese problem . They concluded i t was a mili t ary, not civilian , pr oblem . 
The West Coast Congressional Del ega tion, on Februa r y 13 , pressed the President 
fo r t he Evacua t ion of all persons of Japanese descent . Del,i tt, as Comma nding 
General of the Western Defense Command, forwarded to Secretary of War Stimson 
on February 14, his final recommendation on the subject of " Evacua t ion of 
Japanese and Other Subversive Persons From the Pacific Coast.,,48 
DelJitt ' s final recomme ndation exp l ains the military fears of J apanes e a t-
tack , sabotage , and espionage . It a lso expresses the same racial ha tred of 
the Japanese that was exhibited by the nativists , the economic pr essure groups, 
a nd the politicia ns : 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
-The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and 
third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed 
of United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized ,' the 
racial strains are undiluted. It, therefore, follows that 
along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies 
of Japanese extraction are at large today. There are indica-
tions that these are organized and ready for concerted action 
at a favorable opportunity . The very fact that no sabotage 
has taken place to date is a disturbin~ and confirming indi-
cation that such action will be taken. 9 
34 
Del~it t urged exclusion of Japanese aliens, Japanese-Amer ican citizens, other 
enemy aliens, and any other suspect subversives from military areas decided 
upon at his discretion. At this point DeWitt advised internment for all aliens 
and subversives. The Japanese-American citizen had the opportunity to accept 
volun tary internment. 50 
At the time of Delo/itt' s final recommendation , the President was also being 
urged by Secretary of War Stimson, the West Coast Delegation, West Coast offi-
cials and organizations, the press, and the radio to make a decision on the 
Japanese problem. This was a critical time for Roosevel t. The war had to be 
won . It was imperative to keep unity at home to win the peace or become another 
I~oodrow IHlson. And he had to keep his m'O political party intact. l-lith these 
three objectives in mind, Roosevelt chose not to avoid the Japanese problem, 
but responded in a manner in which he excelled--by playing "broker politics." 
In signing Executive Order No. 9066, Roosevelt authorized the Secretary of War 
to choose the military commanders who would, at their discretion, determine 
which areas would be considered military and any persons who would be excluded 
(rom these areas. The Secretary of Ivar or the military commanders would pro-
vide "such transportation, food shelter , and other accommodations as may be 
necessary ."S1 
The Secretary of \var designated Ivestern Defense Commander John DeHitt to 
implement Executive Order No. 9066. From this moment the fate of some 80,000 
Japanese-American citizens was determined. The removal and eventual internment 
of American citizens was now legal through Presidential proclamation and by 
military necessity. Agitation from the racists, pressure groups, and the mil-
itary succeeded in placing any American citizen under the complete control of 
the military during war-time. This small, politically powerless group of Ivest 
Coast Japanese-American citizens were the victims of racism, greed , and fear 
emanating from the racists, pressure groups, and the military. 
In examining the three agitating groups responsible for the Japanese-
American evacuation during Horld l.Jar II, it may be concluded that no single, 
or even two, groups of anti-Japanese could have succeeded in a feat of this 
magni tud e . In order for this violation of civil liberties to take place, it 
is necessary to cite these combined forces: the waning course of the war in 
the Pacific with the steadily increasing pressure from the agitating groups. 
The deteriorating condition in the South Pacific, the agitation of the racists, 
pressure groups , and the military working In concert , produced the attitude 
assumed by many on the h'est Coast--to hell with habeaus corpus. 
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TITUS OATES : 
AUTHOR OF THE POP I SH PLOT 
lihen violence and factions are the order of the day , and a co urt system 
prevails whi ch gives credence t o rumo r a nd hearsay , plotting and the discovery 
of plots naturally become the major occupations o f the time . Such was the 
situation in England during the fall of 1678 . The populace was general l y sus-
picious and distrustful of the restored mo narch Charles II . The rise of arbi -
trary governmen t seemed manifes ted in the actions of Thomas Osbo rne , Earl o f 
Danby, Charles ' Lord Treasurer. Also , t he fea r o f popery was intensified by 
the presence of James, Duke of York, a Catholic convert, brother to Cha rles 
a nd s uccessor to the t hr one . lihen Danby a nd James joined forces in their po-
litical policies , the a tmosphere became even tenser. This situation laid t he 
groundwork for one of the mos t astute informers of t he time , Ti t us Oates . l 
Though Titus Oates was undoubtedly a " l ying madman , " his fabricated t a le 
of a fiendish Popish Plot made him a national hero and resulted in t he execu-
tion of numerous innocent people. His backg r ound of pe r j ury should have been 
sufficient to invalidate his statements; however , the prevailing popular f eel-
ing of animosi ty toward Papis ts and the political situat ion insured his s uccess 
as an informer . CharIest reluctance co discount Oates' testimony evidences the 
pO\ver of popula r sentiment duri ng this period . Even af ter the King successfully 
ca ugh t Oates in severa l obvious lies rela ting t o the s upposed plo t , he coul d 
not overlook the accusa t ions for fear of bei ng accused of Catholi c sympa thy . 
Oates ' initial s uccess may be attributed t o popular sentiment, but his con t i n-
ued succes s wa s related more closely t o t he poli t ical use made of his plo t. 2 
Although Oates recei ved somp measur e of popularity in 1678 , he had not 
been wel l rece i ved in the pas t. He was an ex tr emely unattractive per son as 
evidenced by a description of his bein g " squat , bull- nec ked, bow- legged , and 
wi t h a jaw s o enormous that his mouth appeared t o be hideously in the middle 
of his fact .,,3 His gro tesque appearance was eq ual l ed by his unsavory back-
gr ound. Born i n 1649 , Ti tus inherited he t erodox leanings f rom his father Samuel 
Oates , an active Anaba ptist during the Interregnum and later the rector of a 
church in Hastings af t e r the Restoration. Both l,Tes t minster School and Cambr i dge 
expelled Titus from their pr emises after only a shor t time in r esidence. Though 
he never mastered Latin, he took holy ord ers after leaving Cambridge and r ece i ved 
a curacy i n Surrey a nd later a vicarage i n Kent in 1673 . Oates was forced to 
leave Ken t on a charge of dr unkenness . Shortly ther eaf ter the Privy Co uncil 
cha r ged him wi th perj ury f or falsely acc using a young boy of sodomy a nd t he boy ' s 
fa ther of treasonab le r ema rks . 4 
Deeming it profitable t o remove himself for a time , Oa t es signed on as 
chaplain for a f r i gate bo und fo r Tangier in May 1675 . On i t s r eturn, Oa t es 
was dismissed fo r homosexual practices . This s omewhat explai ned his mys t eri-
ous expuls i ons from previous positions . In 1677, he served fo r th ree mo nths 
as chaplain to the Pro t estan t memb e r s of the Earl of Nor wich ' s London household 
before being dismissed . Immediately the rea fte r he entered th e Roman Ca t hol i c 
Church , a conversion he la t er insisted wa s insincere. I n spite of t he pa tronage 
of Richard Strange , the English Pr ovincial of the Soc iety o f Jesus , he fai l ed 
Sharyon Shartzer 
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again . His grotesque appearance, age, proven homosexuality, and ignorance of 
Latin were not conducive to success in the Spanish, french or English Jesuit 
schools to which he was sent . finally, in June 1678 Thomas ~~itbread, who 
replaced Strange as Provincial, expelled Oates once again. S 
Angered at the rejection by the Jesuits. Oates decided to use to his ad-
vantage the knowledge he had acquired during his brief association with them 
in fabricating a Popish Plot which could reinstate him in the good graces of 
his alternate faith. It was at this point that he renewed an earlier associ-
ation with Dr. Israel Tonge, a Church of England rector who had for many years 
tried to discover an actual popish plot against the throne. By convincing Tonge 
that he had been hired by the Jesuits to poison him because of his translation 
of a book entitled The Jesuits' Morals, Oates established a staunch ally in 
the person of Tonge . Relying on his recent association with the Jesuits, Oates, 
with the aid of Tonge, drew up a set of forty-three articles outlining an al-
leged papist conspiracy against England and King Charles II . The number even-
tually grew to eighty-one . The plot invented was less than original. It was 
similar to earlier stories such as the Habernfeld Plot and Prynne's interpre-
tation of the Civil loIar, but was redesi~ned to fit the time of Oates . 6 
In short, the plot was structured as follows. The Pope was the leader of 
the conspiracy and had commissioned the Society of the Jesuits to carry out 
his plan to punish England and its sovereign for denouncing the true faith. 
The King was to be either stabbed by Irish ruffians, shot by Jesuits, or poi-
soned by Sir George 1oIakeman, the Queen's physician, and Edward Coleman , Sec-
retary to the Duchess of York. Oates claimed knowledge of specific amounts 
paid for these services. In addition, the Catholics in London were to carry 
out a general murder of all Protestants in England. With the disposal of 
Charles, the Pope planned to offer the crown to James , Duke of York, who was 
to follow the commands of the Pope or be replaced by someone who would. Other 
bedlam revealed by the Articles included the destruction of English commerce, 
a french invasion of Ireland, and Jesuits disguised as Presbyterians were to 
stir up revolt in Scotland. Other major figures implicated besides the Pope 
were the King of france; the General of the Jesuits; Jesuit Provincials in 
England , Spain, and Ireland; and Archbishops and Rectors of Jesuit colleges. 7 
Using Tonge as his agent, Oates began his path to the King and Parliament. 
Since Tonge had no way of directly contactin~ the King, he used an acquaintance, 
Chr i s topher Kirkby, as a go-between. Kirkby, who was in some way employed as 
a chemist by the court, knew the schedule of the King and contacted him on 
August 13, 1678. As supposed plots were a common occurrence, the King paid 
little notice and referred Kirkby to his secretary, 1o/illiam Chiffinch. Refus-
ing to be dismissed, Kirkby took Tonge directly to the King later that same 
day, at which time th ey were referred to Lord Treasurer Danby . This meeting 
with Danby was perhaps the first stroke of luck for Oates since Danby decided 
to make use of the situation. Danby agreed to further investigation of the 
plot because he hoped to improve his standing with Parliament and felt that 
a possible conspiracy might persuade them to appropriate money and arms for 
protection at the next session. Thus far Parliament had refused to concede 
to Danby and the King in this request for fear that a standing army might make 
them strong enough to rule without their aid. Also, James joined with Danby 
in support of the investigation hoping to expose the allegations as false and 
thereby exonerate his fellow Roman Catholics . S James had no fear of implica-
tion since Oates' story was designed for Anglicans a nd the court and against 
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Dissen ters. Oates later went so far as t o give positive testimony that James 
was not a par ty t o the conspiracy . 9 
On September 28th Oates had his first chance to ga in fame as an informer . 
The Privy Council, presided ove r by the King, bega n inves tiga tin~ t he matter. 
Letters to James ' Jesuit confesso r Father Bedingfield, whom Tonge had suggested 
would substantiate his claim, were pronounced fo r geries; Tonge was called be-
fo r the Council and announced that all he knew had come from Oates . Oates 
was called to appear be fore th afternoon session, from which the King was 
absent . Immediately he identified the letters as t o specific authors and pro-
ceeded to give detailed dimensions to his earlier out lined plot . He claimed 
to have secured this first-hand knowledge while living amo ng the Jesuits for 
the sole purpose of spying on them. His quick answers and the minute detail 
offered greatly impressed the Council . Oates became so fi rmly established in 
the confidence of t he Council that the King was unable to prove him a perjurer 
even after pr oving him false in some of his detailed description on the follow-
ing day. Tha t day the Council ordered the arrest of Coleman, the first of many 
arrests based on the fabrications of Oates . A third day of testimony was given 
in which Oates inc reased his charges to include: 
. .. twenty- fo ur English Jesuits, nineteen foreign Jesuits, 
twelve Scottish Jesuits, nine Benedictines , three Carmelites, 
two Franciscans, nine Dominicans, fourteen secular priests, 
four secular persons , four Irish ruffians, and two archbish-
ops . lO 
By October 5th the plot was known by the entire populace. Oates was con-
sidered a national hero, and the Council started disa rming Papis ts and arrest -
ing persons accused by Oates . Thus, the persecution of Catholics and especia lly 
Jesuits began . Many fled the country . Houses were searched and businesses 
ruined. Prisons became filled wi th those who would not take the oath of alle-
giance and supremacy . Severe laws not normally enforced were used against the 
papist community . Oates was lod~ed in Ifhitehall under guard for pr otection 
and granted a pension of twelve-hundred pounds a year for his efforts . While 
a few doubted the truth of his fantastic s t a tements, those who hated the Cath-
olics were eage r to bel i eve his lies . Rumors were circulated to incite a gen-
eral state of terror among the people . Men and women alike went armed . Soon 
everyone was reluctant to disa gree with Oates for fear of being labeled a 
Papist. ll By November 30 , 1678 a ll the Popish Lords were expelled from the 
House by refusing to swear t o the Pu rliamentary Test Act, with the exception 
of three who did . Those in the Commons did take the oa th. 12 
Oates ' position was f ur ther enhanced by two events which seemed to sub-
stantia t e his statements . The first was the seizur e of treasonable letters 
written by Coleman, Secretary to the Duchess of York, t o French Jesui t s . ~~ile 
there was nothing in them about murder or conspiracy , they did allude t o the 
day that James would succeed his brother upon the throne and the ultimate rise 
of Roman Catholicism in England with the help of French money . These statements 
were looked upon by the Council as supporting proof o f the conspiracy revealed 
by Oates . It has been no t ed that Coleman was perha ps the only one of Oates ' 
victims who was truly guil ty of a crime . 13 The importance of this event is 
revealed by a contemporary John Evelyn, in speaking about the much later tria l 
of William Howard, Viscount Stafford: 
Such a man's testimony should not be taken against the life of 
a dog. But the merit of something material which he discovered 
against Coleman, put him in such esteem with the Parliament, 
that now, I fancy, he stuck at nothing, and thought everybody 
was to take what he said for gospel.l4 
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The second event beneficial to Oates was the disappearance of Sir Edmund 
Godfrey. Godfrey, a staunch Protestant magistrate, had witnessed the deposi-
tions of Oates earlier in September. In the middle of October he vanished, 
and five days later his body was discovered. Even before the discovery, it 
was rumored that he had been murdered by Papists. Though the actual mystery 
of his death has never been solved, this incident added fuel to the fire that 
Oates had already set. Godfrey's body was found with his own sword through 
it, but medical examination revealed that he had been previously strangled . 
Rumors spread that Godfrey had been murdered by Papists because he had helped 
in publishing their plot. The Country Party--la ter known as l.Jhigs--led by 
Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftsbury, seized on the opportunity to stir 
up anti-Catholic feeling against the monarchy. The chief aim of this group 
was to secure a Protestant succession to the throne. By pointing out the 
horror of a Catholic monarch, his group hoped to discredit Charles, James and 
Danby and break up the existing House of Commons. Godfrey's corpse was used 
to add to the panic already initiated by Oates. It was exhibited for public 
view and guards were posted to protect the minister who performed the funeral 
ceremony. Even though Shaftsbury may not have been a party to Oates ' original 
plot, he used it to the fullest extent to gain his a..n objectives . 1S 
Opposing the Country Party were the Tories or supporters of the monarch. 
The Tories as well as Charles could not afford to openly refute the accusations 
made by Oates for fear of being added to his next list of conspirators. On 
November 9, 1678, in his speech to both houses Charles, in essence, agreed to 
support the Catholic persecution which was to follow for the next two years. 
He did stress, however, that any measures taken should not interfere with the 
rightful succession of James to the throne when he stated: 
And therefore I am come to assure you, that whatsoever Bills 
you shall present, to be passed into laws, to make you safe 
in the reign of my Successor, (so they tend not to impeach 
the Right of Succession, nor the descent of the crown in the 
true line; and so as they restrain not my power, nor the just 
rights of any Protestant Successor.) shall find from me a 
ready concurrence. And I desire you withal, to think of some 
effectual means for the conviction of Popish Recusants, and 
to expedite your councils as fast as you can, that the world 
may see our unanimity . and that I may have an opportunity of 
showing you how ready I am to do anything that may give com-
fort and satisfaction to such dutiful and loyal subjects."16 
On this wave of popular sentiment, Oates ' reputation grew and he continued 
to invest new incriminating evidence to insure his position. At this point 
other disreputable informers sought to share in Oates' rewards by confirming 
his statements and adding their own details. More and more people were accused. 
Any connection with the Catholic faith left persons open to attack. On Novem-
ber 24, 1678, Oates went so far as to openly accuse the Queen of being a party 
to the conspiracy to murder her husband and to haVing arranged the assassination 
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of Godfrey . Oates was encouraged by the Country Party which had long been in 
favor of the King ' s divorcing Catherine who was a Catholic. His subsequent mar-
riage to a Protestant they hoped would insure a Protestant suc cession . Though 
Charles was known to be unfaithful to Catherine, he proved loyal in this instance 
and would not permit her to fall vic tim to Oates. Having considerable support 
in the House of Lords, Catherine was exonerated. Severe cross-examination of 
Oates and the oth r major informer, Hilliam Bedloe, exposed considerable incon-
sistencies in their testimony. Oates was thrown in prison for a time, but three 
of the Queen ' s servants as well as Coleman were convicted . 17 
Coleman's was the first of the plot trials. Though he was convicted and 
subseq uently executed on December 3rd, his trial began the effectual discredit -
ing of Oates. Under cross- examina tion Oates ' technical reliability began to 
waver . Soon his testimo ny alone was not sufficient to convict the Jesuits he 
accused and other informers had to be produced . A string of convictions and 
executions ensued . Charles was forced to sign the executions of men he knew 
to be innocent . Firs t came the executions of the Jesuits Ireland, Pickering 
and Grove , accused of conspiracy to murder the King. Next came the executions 
of Green, Berry, and Hill, supposed murderers of Godfrey . In June 1679 , those 
executed were Ifhitbread, Provincial of the English Jesuits, and Fenwick, Har-
court, Gavan, and Turner (other priests) also accused of conspiring to murder 
the King . In addition, Richard Langhorn , a Catholic lawyer , fell victim . 
Langhorn was accused of raising a Papist army to invade England . Thirty-seven 
deaths h.we been attributed to the per;ured testimony of Oates and his fellow 
informers . IS 
The first major r everse occurred fo r Oates and his gang when they attempted 
to incriminate Samuel Pepys as a means of attacking James, Duke of York . Pepys 
had been chief advisor to James when he had been Lord High Admiral . The gr oup 
attempted to ge t to Pepys through his clerk , Samuel Atkins . The plan was t o 
accuse Atkins of complicity in Godfrey ' s murder in hopes t hat Atkins would tes-
ti fy against Pepys in his fear of being arrested . However , t he pla n backfir ed 
when Atkins not only refused to lie, but also produced a reliable alibi to pr ove 
his own innocence . Mr. Pepys, char ged with being a Roman Catholic , was commi t -
ted t o the tower on Hay 22 , 1679. Because the planned evidence was not fo rth-
coming , he was released on June 2nd on bail of thirty - thousand pounds . On J une 
30, 16S0, he was finally discharged without a trial . 19 
A second major set-back for Oa tes IJas the acq uittal of Sir Geo r ge I,akeman, 
the Queen's physiCian , and three Benedi t brothers on July lS , 1679 . The four 
were accused of conspiracy to poison the King and subvert the Protestant r eli -
gion . The reason is not clearly identified why the Chief Jus t ice did not sup-
port the informers but instead proved their testimony to be criminally perj ured. 
The effect of this acquittal was the division of the nation in t o two ha l ves--
those who saw that t hey had been deceived and those who remained fait hful to 
Oates . The la t ter were fas t declining in number . Though restored somewha t by 
the sham "Heal Tub Plot" i n October 1679, Oates ' prestige suffered even mo r e 
damage in J une of l6S0 when the Earl of Castlemai n was acquitted in spi t e of 
Oates ' testimony to the effect that Castlemain "had been i n correspondence wi t h 
t he Spanish Jes uits as well as St . Omers about the ' design . ", 20 
The continued decline of Oa tes ' fol lm.ers is evidenced by t he r eac tion 
to the trial a nd conviction of Viscount Stafford i n November- December l6S0 fo r 
treason: 
II 
il 
:1 
II 
I 
The people knew him to be blameless, except for his religion, 
and that the evidence given at his trial was one long tissue 
of lies by Shaftsbury's paid informers . Slowly their sanity 
was returning . 21 
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By the time the last victim, Oliver Plunket, was executed , Oates' popular-
ity had diminished greatly . Plunket, an Irish Archbishop, was hanged, drawn, 
and quartered on July 1, 1681. Again, Charles was aware that this victim was 
innocent, but he did nothing to save Plunket because "his [Charles] enemies were 
still waiting for him to make a false step."22 However, in September 1681, 
Charles at last began to turn on the informers. Stephen College, a Whig inti-
mate of many of the Plot witnesses was executed in August 1681 in spite of Oates' 
testimony in his defense. A week later his allowance from the King was entirely 
cut off and he was fo rbidden to appear at court . Oates' weekly allowance for 
maintenance had never been large in view of his residence at h~itehall Palace. 
Its reduction had begun in July 1680, and had always been temporary as he never 
received a funded pension for life from Charles. It is supposed that Shaftsbury 
paid some amount to Oates, but that is not certain. He did receive some money 
in lump sums as the author of his Narrative and other works: The Cabinet of the 
Jesuits' Secrets Opened, An Exact Discovery of the Mystery of Iniquity as it is 
now in Practice amongst the Jesuits, and The Pope's Warehouse, or, the Merchan-
dise of the Whore of Rome, all published in 1679. During this time, a Tory 
journalist Sir Roger l'Estrange was periodically attacking the inconsistencies 
of Oates' original evidence. The nation gradually began to realize that Oates' 
plot was a fraud exploited by Shaftsbury for the purpose of excluding the "Papist" 
James II from succession . At age 3D, Oates was again living on charity.23 
In 1683, discovery of the "Rye House Plot ," a conspiracy by Whig radicals 
to assassinate both the King and the Duke of York further destroyed Oates' most 
powerful supporters. However, he did not give up easily; in 1684 he petitioned 
the Bishop of London asking "how the government could in good conscience license 
denials of a Plot in which it had several times announced its belief."24 This 
was to no avail as the Duke of York had been reinstated and loyal ism was now 
the order of the day . On May 10th he was arrested for a treasonable remark 
made about the Duke of York in April 1680 . Having no defense, he was charged 
one-hundred thousand pounds damages a nd thrown in debtors' prison . Further 
charges were brought against him for perjury and he was placed in chains . Two 
days after the death of Charles II his trial began. It focused on the perjured 
evidence he had given at the trial of Ireland, Grove, and Pickering on December 
17, 1678. No la~er would defend him and witnesses he called would not support 
his statements. 25 
In spite of Oates' adept defense in his own behalf, he was found guilty of 
perjury. The judges, noting that "sentence of death or mutilation was no longer 
legal," issued a sentence meant to serve the same end. In addition to a fine 
and being "unfrocked," he was sentenced to life imprisonment with annual appear-
ances in the pillory. Before starting his imprisonment, he was to be whipped 
from Aldgate to Newgate; then after a day's rest from Newgate to Tyburn. The 
total distance was three and one-half miles. The fact that he survived to be 
imprisoned was remarkable. He remained in prison for the rest of James' reign 
with periodic appearances in the pillory as sentenced. \fuen the "Glorious 
Revolution" came in 1688, he was freed. In 1689 he petitioned the House of 
Lords for a reversal of his sentence. Though he was granted a free pardon by 
William III, his conviction stood, and he was barred from appearing as a witness 
in any court of law. In addition, he was forbidden to practice his "priestly 
calling . " 26 
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Upon request by the Commons, he was granted a meager a llowance of ten 
pounds per week from \~illiam III. This was later increased to a "lump sum of 
five-hundred pounds , and three- hundred pounds a year" in place of his allowance . 
Oates remained friendly with the "old Whig extremists , " and publicized his feel -
ing of martyrdom t hr ough his book A Display of Tyranny, which dealt with his 
treatmen t hy James II . John Evelyn noted that \~illiam III did not approve of 
this book . 27 
The days of plott i ng and discove r y of plots had come to an end . The fea r 
of poper y , as i n t he days of Charles II, had subsided ; Oates could no longer 
fi nd an audi ence f or his tales of fiendish "designs " against the monarch or 
himself . I n view of his circumstances , Oa t es was fo r ced to undergo a persona l 
transformation . I n 1693 he abandoned his homosexuality and mar r ied a "wealthy 
ci ty widow , " pr obab l y t o impr ove his financial s t a tus . In 1698 he effected a 
second change when he became a member of t he Baptist clergy at Wapping. However, 
he continued to live up to his reputation as evidenced by his explusion in 1701 , 
after several scandals . Titus Oates, a man whose perjured lies caused the exe-
cution or ruin of numerous innocent people in 1678- 79 , was a free man livi ng 
on a fu nded pens ion on July 12, 1705 , when he died at the age of 56--i n t he 
opinion of some , 56 years t oo late . 2o 
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